63 
ductive reasonings will conduct us to something more than 
to conclusions which are merely probable, and we need not 
manufacture a new process, called “ assent, ” to give them 
certainty. 
42. Dr. Newman also heavily complains of deductive reason- 
ings, because they furnish no means of dealing with first prin- 
ciples, and first principles are variously assumed by men of 
different minds. It is a mere truism to say that we must start 
with assumptions. The unknown must be referred to the known; 
the uncertain to the certain. But the necessity which we are 
under of starting with assumptions prior to calling into exercise 
our deductive intellects, has no tendency to make our conclu- 
sions simple probabilities. The danger arises from men often 
assuming as first principles what have no right to be viewed as 
such, from their prejudices, or the dictates of their affections 
or their passions. When considerable numbers of the wisest 
and the best question our first principles, it is a reason for 
thinking that they may originate in our idiosyncrasies rather 
than be actual measures of thought, and for subjecting them 
to a rigid scrutiny. But this does not convert all reasoning 
into a question of mere probability. 
43. For the purpose of illustrating the unsatisfactoriness of 
verbal reasoning, Dr. Newman adduces the difficulty of ascer- 
taining the true readings of Shakespeare, and endeavours to 
show that such processes involve higher acts of the mind, 
which formal inference cannot touch. “ It is obvious,” says 
he, “ that a verbal argumentation on 20,000 corrections is 
impossible.” No doubt it is, and many other processes 
besides verbal reasonings, are necessary for ascertaining 
truth. But this by no means proves that all formal 
logic is useless to the critic. To determine the value 
of various readings requires a practised judgment, and 
many other faculties which cannot, with our ordinary know- 
ledge, be reduced to logical formula. But when one who 
possesses such faculties wishes to enforce his judgments on 
others, he must either reason, or find out some means of con- 
vincing them that he is entitled authoritatively to decide. But 
how are others to know that he is so ? We have no intuitive 
faculty to enable us to perceive this. If, therefore, others are 
to admit such an authority, it must be enforced by sufficient 
reasons, of which the logical intellect must judge, or be derived 
from inspiration. 
44. I agree with Dr. Newman in thinking that the mind con- 
stantly infers without leaving a distinct trace of the inferential 
process in the consciousness. Some of our acts of inference 
are also extremely complicated. These, by which we estimate 
