69 
If I may not assume that I exist, and in a particular way, i.e., with a parti- 
cular mental constitution, I have nothing to speculate on, and I had better 
let speculation alone. Such as I am, it is my all ; this is my essential stand- 
point, and must be taken for granted ; otherwise thought is but an idle 
amusement, not worth the trouble I am what I am, or I am 
nothing. I cannot think, reflect, or judge, without starting from the very 
point which I aim at concluding. My ideas are all assumptions, and I am 
ever moving in a circle. I cannot avoid being sufficient for myself, for I 
cannot make myself anything else, and to change me is to destroy me,” &c. 
56. Several sentences in this remarkable passage are 
worthy of our deepest attention ; but taking it as a whole, I 
cannot but consider the position as one which is extremely 
dangerous and unsound. It seems to me to leave us little 
alternative between taking refuge in authority, or assuming 
that truth for man is that which each man troweth. Dr. 
Newman expressly states that in all concrete matter the sole 
and final judgment on the validity of an inference is committed 
to what he designates “ the illative sense.” 
57. In the remaining chapters in which he treats of its nature 
and character, he expressly affirms that there is no scientific 
method whereby the goodness or the badness of its judgments 
can be tested, or even held in check. (C I am what I am,” 
says he, “ or I am nothing. I cannot, think, reflect, or judge, 
without starting from the very point which I aim at con- 
cluding. My ideas are all assumptions, and I am ever moving 
in a circle.” I am far from denying the existence of partial 
truth in the passages which I have quoted ; but in the sense 
in which they are here used, they seem to me to lead to the 
conclusion, that we are destitute of all other criteria of truth 
or means of eliminating error except those supplied by the 
illative sense of each individual. If it be said that Dr. New- 
man expressly limits these assertions to concrete questions, I 
reply that the passage which is inclosed in a parenthesis 
asserts that it is no less true in abstract reasonings ; for, says 
he, “ although the reasoning is abstract, the mind which 
judges of it is concrete.” This resolves abstract reasonings 
into concrete ones, of the validity or invalidity of which the 
sole judge is the illative sense of each individual. 
58. Again, says Dr. Newman, “ Reason never bids us be cer- 
tain except on absolute proof.” I reply, i{ Reason bids us to 
accept as certain self-evident intuitions, the testimony of our 
consciousness, the primary instincts of our nature ; and accepts 
things as certain on much other evidence, which, unless I greatly 
misunderstand the former portions of this work, Dr. Newman 
would not allow to admit of absolute proof. If the sole judge of 
