76 
tude to him, and it may continue to be so, even on the second and third 
occasions of his seeing it. But on the fourth occasion he may say, “ Though 
I did think it was water before, my experience has now proved to me that 
that idea was a mistake ; ” and if you tell me that that is a moral rather 
than an intellectual matter, I join issue at once. He may say of the 
mirage, “ I am now absolutely certain that it is not water ; I was illusively 
convinced before.” That surely is a case in which a man, after having been 
four or five times in error before, has a right to reap the advantage of his 
previous mistakes, and to have an absolute conviction which is not illusory. 
I think Dr. Newman would be right in saying that a man might be in error 
three or four times, and yet the very next time have an absolute certitude. 
There is much in this page of Mr. Bow’s paper with which I cannot agree, 
especially where he speaks of death. I think Dr. Newman and Mr. Bow are 
equally wrong, when they state that if a man says “ I shall die ” he expresses 
a certitude : the only difference between them is that Dr. Newman does not 
allow it to be conditional, while Mr. Bow asserts that it is, that it will happen 
if there is no miracle to prevent it. Now I maintain that no man has a right 
to say “ I shall die ; ” it is not a fair example— it is not a case of certitude 
at all. Who shall say that the world may not end in our lifetime ? and yet 
that would not be a special miracle. The illustration is an unfortunate one 
both for Dr. Newman to have originated, and for Mr. Bow to have adopted, 
because I do not think it involves a case of certitude at all. There is one 
other question which I must touch upon, and that is as to whether a certi- 
tude may rise higher than the evidence upon which it is based ? That is a 
very important question, and I confess that my mind is not thoroughly made 
up upon it. I should say that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the 
certitude would not rise higher than the evidence. I could not say, for 
instance, that Mr. Bow is a clever man unless I expressed a conviction on a 
level with the evidence on which it is based, and we have in this paper quite 
sufficient grounds for such a conviction. (Hear, hear.) In ninety-nine cases 
out of a hundred that principle would remain true ; but take another case, 
that of the existence of God. The atheist maintains that when you use the 
argument of design to prove the awful and insuperably grand conception that 
there is a Supreme Creator, Eternal and Omnipotent, you have there a con- 
viction expressed which is higher than the evidence upon which it is based. 
I mean to say that the skill and design, which we see in creation, great as 
they are, do not afford to the atheistic mind a sufficient base for the certitude 
of the existence of God. To my mind they do afford it ; but how far it can 
be thoroughly established that the evidence is exactly equal to the conviction 
arrived at is what I am in doubt about, and I should like to hear some other 
opinions expressed upon it. I can quite conceive that form of reasoning to 
meet Paley’s argument from the watch, arguing the existence of a maker 
from its skill and contrivance — I can quite conceive that form of reasoning 
which alleges that the conviction arrived at in the case of the universe is 
higher than the evidence on which it rests. At the same time I go with 
