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definition as it appears in his essay, that certitude, by which he means a 
personal assent, is not capable of variation or of degrees. But whether it is 
capable of variation or not is scarcely worth contending about. What Dr. 
Newman says is, that I may feel quite sure of a certain thing and have no 
sort of doubt whatever upon the matter, and that is my certitude ; but he is 
careful to tell us that it does not follow that there is any certainty in it. 
There may be no certainty at all in the matter. Then Mr. Bow does not 
take notice of this — that Dr. Newman lays it down that these certitudes are 
not only without any doubt or degrees, but are absolutely indefectible ; 
and he does not mean that they are so because they represent in any measure a 
truth, for he says distinctly, so far as I can understand him, that a prejudice 
native to the soul of a man is as indefectible in its nature as any truth 
intuitively apprehended. He shows us, by interesting explanations, how, by a 
combination of intuitive impressions and unconscious inferences, the assent 
of the mind is given to a conclusion as if it were intuitively certain, and 
axiomatically true, though it may really be a mere prejudice. Such conclu- 
sions, true or false, abide. A man may seem to change his fundamental 
convictions, but in reality there is very little change at all : there is only 
a falling off of many inconsistent ideas, while the radical truths and preju- 
dices in the mind live there still, and their development leads to a man 
being supposed by others to be inconsistent, though in reality he is not 
inconsistent, but is only changing in the sense of developing. There are 
some very interesting expositions of this kind in Dr. Newmans essay, in 
which he shows that men holding such principles do not at first know all 
their inconsistencies, but by degrees those inconsistencies fall off, and the 
men themselves remain the same men, holding the same certitudes as they 
held at the beginning, while the things which are inconsistent gradually fall 
away, leaving the radical principles of- their faith behind, coming out finally 
into full form and development. Then there is another part of Dr. New- 
man’s remarkable views on this subject. We may feel sure, and our assu- 
rance may have no doubt whatever about it, but that does not imply that 
there is any sort of objective reality or truth whatever in it. Dr. Newman 
goes on to ask, How is a man to feel sure on debateable points ? He lays 
it down that there are only two ways in which a man can get to be assured 
of anything. One is in virtue of a conviction that has taken hold of his being, 
and that is not likely to be dethroned ; but Dr. Newman admits that there 
are many things which we are expected to believe, but which we have not 
intelligence or apprehension enough to understand, and he then consistently 
teaches in effect thus : “ If I cannot get certitude on my own account, I 
must take it by proxy — I must go to authority. I must go to some man 
whom I know to be very wise and very good, and knowing that I am 
but poor and ignorant compared with him, I take his certitude and make 
it my own. So, as to spiritual truths, I give up my own will and mind to 
the ‘ certitude ’ which the Church teaches, as I have not any of my own. 
I do not understand what it is that is taught, but the Church teaches me 
