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the acceptance of a probability is just as much a matter of strong will and of 
the resolute determination of the mind, as is the acceptance of an assent. Dr. 
Newman says a great deal about the “ illative faculty.” It is easy to call the 
whole power and exercise of the mind by which we reason an illative faculty, 
and no doubt there is one grand department of the mind by which we are able 
to apprehend and infer, and to connect premises with conclusions, and to go, 
often instinctively, through the processes of induction. But if it is to be sup- 
posed that in speaking of an “ illative faculty” a discovery has been made, I 
confess I cannot understand it, as it was always known that we had these 
various powers, and it was open to any one to call them by this name at any 
time. As to calling all this an “ illative faculty” in any special sense, I think 
that that sort of language has misled even Dr. N ewman himself, as well as some 
of those who have read his essay. I cannot help thinking that Dr. Newman 
has come to this conclusion : that induction and all that belongs to inductive 
reason is entirely separate from intuitive certainty, that there is no basis of 
intuitive certainty on which inductive processes themselves repose,— that 
there are no intuitive principles of the mind which can be recognized, defined, 
and analyzed,— and that what we call induction, so to speak, is a mere rule of 
thumb. Here again Dr. Newman agrees precisely with Hume and with Mill. 
I remember that Dr. Chalmers fought this out long ago with Hume. The 
question was whether the uniformity of nature was in any sense whatever an 
intuition of the mind, — whether the law of cause and effect was in any sense 
an intuition of the mind, — or whether all that we believe as to causation and 
the uniformity of the laws of nature was a mere matter of inference by us 
from the fact that those laws have operated in such a manner so many times, 
and they probably will so operate again. They actually tell us that all our 
certainty is a mere matter of calculation from probabilities, not resting on 
any foundation of intuitive principle whatever. It is clear to me that all that 
is of a piece with this essay, and Dr. Newman does not allow that there is any 
sort of assurance in our conclusions, only that we come to such conclusions be- 
cause of our experience. All that we can get at is a persuasion in our own 
minds, but to the bottom of that persuasion we can never get. There is one 
point on which I do not agree with Mr. Row . In his 50th section, he has 
referred to the question involved in those peculiar powers of mind possessed 
by some people, such as weather-wise peasants, eminent physicians, clever Old 
Bailey lawyers, and other experts, which powers have been commented on 
in a very interesting illustration by Dr. Newman. Mr. Row intimates 
that probably persons with these wonderful faculties have certain intuitive 
powers which others do not possess ; but I must quarrel with that view, for 
I do not believe that there is any set of men who possess intuitive powers 
different from those of other men. I think there is a fallacy in the use 
of the word “intuitive.” Everything we do is in a sense intuitive all 
our processes of reasoning in a sense are intuitive, and even if we put a 
syllogism it is a matter of intuition. All the processes are intuitive, and the 
question is how to weave them together safely and wisely so as to bring us to 
