as 
principles of Dr. Newman’s book which I have brought before you ; and I 
am certain that they contain the inherent principles of scepticism. When 
you consider that Dr. Newman’s book contains 300 pages of scientific matter, 
you will readily understand that it is very difficult to represent it properly 
within the short compass of thirty pages. I could have written severs, 
papers on the book far more easily than I have written this one. But there is 
another thing which has had some influence in making my paper more obscure, 
and that is, my determination not to touch upon the immense number of 
theological illustrations with which Dr. Newman’s book is full. Take one of 
them— connected with notional and real belief. He tells us that Spam 
and I think Italy-and two or three of the most degraded nations of 
Europe, give a real assent to these truths, whereas I cannot give anything 
but a notional assent. It is unspeakably impudent to say that the more 
degraded the people of a Roman Catholic country, the more real is the 
assent given to religious truth, while the more a man is enlightened the less 
real is his assent. However, I do not think it fair to look at Dr. Newmans 
book theologically ; but I own that any one reading it for a first time will 
be rather caught by it, because there is a speciousness m it untd you ana- 
lyse it, and then the mischief comes out. The more you analyse it the more 
you will be dissatisfied with its principles, philosophical and religious. _ I am 
happy to observe that none of the arguments which have been used m this 
discussion touch any material point in my paper. First, as to the pom 
dwelt upon by Mr. Titcomb with regard to a man bemg certain a hundred 
times. He mistakes the question. The essence of the point is, that however 
many times a man may have been in error, even up to a hundred times, and 
however often error is proved against him, he has as good a right to his 
hundred and first conviction as if he had never made a mistake before. 
Now, I say that the man who does that is wanting m the grace of humiii y. 
If I had been in error a hundred times, and were as confident as ever on 
the hundred-and-first occasion, I think I should be very wanting m modesty. 
It is not a case of a man being one, or two, or even three times wrong, as 
Mr. Titcomb supposes : but even then a man ought to have his confidence 
in the certainty of his conclusion somewhat abated. Let me go once more 
into the philosophy of this question. The essence of Dr. Newmans book 
is founded on the absolute character of assent, and, as he infers abo, the 
absolute character of certitudes. The position which I have taken is, that 
assents are not absolutely given, and X differ from Dr. Bigg in thinking that 
we have absolute certitudes, in the sense in which I understand the word 
“ absolute.” Taking the abstract idea of certitude, I hold that it cannot 
admit of degrees ; but in the ordinary language of mankind, we speak of 
beimr more or less certain. In fact, all my certitudes are relative to the 
evidence on which they rest ; but Dr. Newman wishes to separate between 
certitude and rational connection, and connection and the evidence on which 
it rests; in fact, his object is to enable us to arrive at ia cert atude with 
other evidence than that of having authority to support it. But he even 
