4 
is that which is found in the Moral sense. This, then, must 
be our subject for the present occasion. Popular philosophy 
gathers round this peculiar capacity of man, on the one hand 
in hostility to its peculiarity, and on the other hand in defence. 
Let us see how the conflict goes. 
We may place one of ourselves as the instance of humanity 
under review. We stand, as it were, outside this individual, 
and with whatever openings and light we can command w T e 
endeavour to look within, so as to discover one, at least, of his 
grand characteristics. Specially, we wish to find out that 
element of his being in which he is moveable by the true and 
the right. This is properly his Moral sense. 
The man is material, and may be controlled mechanically. 
He is animal, and may be ruled, as other animals are, by 
affections of his merely animal nature. Is the man more than 
can be expressed by “ material ” and “ animal ” ? Like most 
animals, man is social, and may be moved by considerations 
arising out of certain of his relations to his fellow- creatures. 
He may be moved by considerations of this kind of a very 
lofty character; such as respect his country, his race, and 
even the universe at large, with the Great Father at its head. 
Yet in all this he differs in degree, rather than in kind, from 
the lower creatures. Has he any capacity by which he may 
be moved and regulated when not only no mechanical force is 
applied, but, also, when no merely animal or social element of 
his being can be addressed ? 
When we are in search of that which is generically distinct in 
the capacities of man, as a creature capable of being governed, 
we find ourselves, by careful thought, carried entirely beyond 
all ideas of personal, social, and even universal safety and 
comfort, into another region altogether. Every action that is 
right may appear also to be useful — if the sweep of thought 
connected with it be wide enough, it will, no doubt, always 
appear useful as well as right, — but that same “if” implies a 
great deal. In the vast majority of minds there is no such 
sweep of thought as is implied in the perception of the 
utility of all that is right. In these minds, in multitudes of 
instances, there is nothing but the idea of right to go by. 
May they be controlled when nothing but that idea affects 
them ? May they be repelled when nothing but the idea of 
wrong repels ? In other words, may a man appreciate the 
maxim that he should never do wrongly, even that good may 
come ? These questions direct us in our search for that which 
is supremely moral in man, that, too, which supremely dis- 
tinguishes him from the lower creation. Our moral constitu- 
tion is not to be sought for in physiology, nor yet in our 
