in our supposed case, gain some feeling of right and wrong or a 
conscience.”* If I understand at all what the term right 
truly means in moral discussions, “the public good” which 
can be promoted by killing the individual who merely stands 
in the way of it, and from no fault of his, has, and can have, 
nothing in common with that meaning. It cannot be right to 
promote such “ good,” nor can it be wrong to abhor it. The 
moral sense is just that capacity of feeling by which we are 
shocked at such a representation of “'good,” and the moral 
idea is essentially that eternal thought which underlies that 
capacity. 
It may be well to remark here that I do not find it possible 
to cope with the more popular of philosophical errors while 
adhering to the common use of certain terms, or even when 
following in the beaten track of thought without deviation. It 
is forced, I think, upon one who reasons impartially to observe 
that the strongest points in sceptical argument are laid to the 
sceptics hand by authors whose aim is directly opposed to 
his. The Christian thinker is bound to consider this, and to 
let go his own most cherished terms and notions, when false, 
and fitted only to favour the foe. You will see the bearing of 
this remark as I proceed. 
In seeking to clear our way more fully to the true moral 
idea, we come strongly into collision with the too common 
notion of “ instinct .** Darwin says of the moral qualities, that 
“ their foundation lies in the social instincts,” including in this 
term “ the family ties.” He says further, that “ these instincts 
are of a highly complex nature ; and, in the case of the lower 
animals, give special tendencies towards certain definite actions; 
but . the more important elements for us are love and the 
distinct emotion of sympathy.! It is, so to speak, the friction 
caused by the crossing of instincts that gives rise to the idea 
of “ ought,” or “ duty,” as Darwin views it. He says, “Any 
instinct which is permanently stronger or more enduring than 
another, gives rise to the feeling which we express by saying 
that it ought to be obeyed. A pointer dog, if able to reflect 
on his past conduct, would say to himself, ‘I ought* (as, 
indeed, we say of him) f to have pointed at that hare, and not 
have yielded to the passing temptation of hunting it.* ** J 
What is really meant by “instinct** in such connections as 
these? The “instinct** of pointing at the hare is contrasted 
with the “ instinct** of hunting it. Why should we call these 
“instincts** ? If we look into the mind of the dog by means 
* Descent of Man, vol. i. ed. 1871, p. 73. 
X Ibid., p. 392. 
f Ibid., vol. ii. p. 394. 
