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lie alone does anything’ that is done j that force which per- 
forms the entire experiment is his own force. How is it that 
he so completely forgets this truth ? His will, or he himself 
in volition, is the “absolute commencement” of every change 
that takes place ; yet he never once mentally refers to this 
in all he says, though speaking of “ matter and force ” ! 
According to his teaching, the matter arranges itself, divides 
itself, unites itself! though in every instance he gives that 
initiatory motion which merely passes through certain changes 
till it is balanced by other forces and then ceases. How 
wonderfully (as we might put it) John Tyndall forgets John 
Tyndall, and yet all the while speaks of him. He says “ I can 
show you something.” Then he adds, “ I pour a little water 
m which a crystal has been dissolved.” He tells us that “ all 
force may be ultimately resolved into a push or a pull in a 
straight line.” We thus learn that that which pushes or pulls 
alone has force. Suppose that fifty people stood one behind 
another, — the last man of the row pushes, the next to him is 
pushed, and so on to the last. All are affected, but one only 
has used force. So it is with all Mr. Tyndall's experiments, 
as with those of every one else. However numerous and 
interesting the changes are in matter which take place, the 
experimenter alone pushes or pulls. He alone has the force. 
It is only because he fails to consider his own personal 
position in such experiments that he is involved in the far 
more serious error of failing to recognize the actions of One 
whose force is so much more vast ; and yet nothing can be 
more palpable than the truth that mind alone is cause, and is 
cause alone in will. 
This is the truth in which, so to speak, morality has its 
foundation. The word has absolutely no meaning, if true 
will is denied. Right and wrong have no meaning in a 
necessitarian philosophy. If all is “ invariable,” all is as it must 
be, and hence it is absurd to say that anything is as it ought 
not to be, or as it ought to be. Moral sense — moral idea — 
moral anything — are phrases which express not even illusions 
if all is necessary ; for then the illusions so-called are among the 
necessary changes, and form part of the “ benevolent ” whole ! 
The “ ought " of Mr. Darwin's pointer dog is unworthy of 
even canine sagacity, if his hunting was necessary and his 
pointing at the moment impossible ! Reason rebels at 
the idea of changes being both moral and necessary, and 
manhood scorns the ignorance which refuses to know. 
The moral sense groans under the effect of those teachings 
and actings that would, if successful, make its very existence 
an <c invariable ” blunder. W e fall back, then, on the perfect 
D 
