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religion is thus quickened by every law or new illustration of 
law • by every fact and legitimate use which is made oi tne 
fact' in science. While science discovers and classifies ana 
names, religion looks on without fear; for reason, which gives 
to science its meaning, gives to religion a shield. 
7 There are of course many things to which religion is in 
one way or another related, which human reason does not 
attempt to fathom, which it does not require to comprehend at 
all, which, in fact, it could not, just because it is finite, iiu, 
that can no more be an objection within the sphere of religion, 
than it would be within the sphere of science. For m science 
there are questions which reason does not solve, and the true 
scientist is not ashamed to say that it is so. In natural science 
he is made to feel what one of the acknowledged teachers in 
mental science feels when he says, “ The truth is, we are face 
to face with that final inexplicability at which, Sir William 
Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate 
facts.” But this impotence of reason to explain all mysteries, 
can be no argument against its legitimate exercise within sucn 
spheres of things as are open to it. . 
8. In science the divine reason reveals itself as adapting 
means to ends, and it is within the function of the human reason 
to find this adaptation. The question of final cause draws deep, 
and we may not always be able to fathom it ; but unless science 
means to be laughed at, she must admit its existence, and 
admit also that she meets it on her every path. Hr. VV. ±>. 
Carpenter says—" But from the time when I first began to 
think upon the subject, I had entertained a distrust of all 
arguments based on those individual instances of adaptation ol 
means to ends, on which Paley and his school built up their 
proofs of ‘ design the fallacy of such arguments lying m 
this, that whilst ' design’ unquestionably implies a de- 
signer/ adaptation of means to ends, how perfect so ever, by 
no means necessarily proves any particular adaptation to have 
been intentional.” But how, then, one may ask, does the 
adaptation of means to ends in any one case take : place t it 
not “ intentional,” is it fortuitous ? There is surely intention 
somewhere. And if the case is one which rises out ot the 
sphere of finite intention, it must be one of intention on the 
part of the infinite mind. There must, we imagine, be thought 
and volition somewhere behind the movement of every atom 
of matter and of every action of what we call law. But thought 
must regulate volition, otherwise action will never put parts 
together in anv way that will intelligently indicate adaptation 
of°means to ends. If things do not go into position of their 
own accord, and jump to ends that contribute to the order and 
