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nothing to the point. In the time when Tacitus wrote the J ews were a 
nation occupying Palestine, and owning the Temple, centuries at least before 
the persecutions they then suffered. There is the fact that prophecy had 
stated they should suffer persecution and be scattered in all lands. That 
is a sample of many other illustrations which might be given ; and I 
come back to the same point, that wherever we get hold of solid and sub- 
stantial facts, which have other facts circling round about them, and 
wherever the powers of the mind are capable of fastening on points preceding 
and succeeding, there we get that which is identical, as a matter of reasoning 
power, with the facts which meet us in science — different in characteristics, 
but identical in substance. As I have already intimated, I heard Mr. 
Mitchell’s paper with a great deal of pleasure, and think in what I have 
said I have not in the least invaded the positions of the paper, but have 
rather strengthened them. (Cheers.) 
The Rev. J. Sinclair. — I cannot too strongly express my appreciation o 
the paper to which we have just listened, and cordially - agree with the 
main position which it expounds and fortifies, namely, as I understand it, 
that reason is the same in all the spheres of its manifestation. What I rose 
to say is that there appears to me to be a little vagueness and* incon- 
sistency in the first part of the paper, which speaks of Hamilton’s and 
Mansel’s theory about faith, and takes an objection to that theory. Mr. 
Mitchell says (section 1) : — 
“ Faith is as really a function of the reason as is the intuition of cause and 
effect, of substance and attribute, of right and wrong, of the finite and 
infinite.” 
Now Sir William Hamilton asserts, with respect, for example, to our faith 
in substance, that it is an ultimate belief ; and calls it a regulative prin- 
ciple of belief which our nature affirms ; distinguishing between that 
belief, and those which are the products of reason. Now Mr. Mitchell 
objects to that way of putting it, and maintains that these beliefs are the 
products of reason as much as any other. Well, I think that in substance 
there is no disagreement between them. It seems to me that the position of Sir 
William Hamilton and Mansel, so far as that is concerned, is incontro- 
vertible— that our belief in these principles is incapable of being proved. 
We must accept them on the faith that- our nature and the composition of 
our being is founded upon truth. If Mr. Mitchell calls that reason, then 
there is substantial agreement between him and Sir William Hamilton, 
but if he objects to his definition, and maintains that there is a distinction 
between what they mean by faith, and what he means by reason, I cannot 
for my part see it. I think that there is substantial agreement between 
them, and the only difference is that Hamilton and Mansel call faith, 
what he calls reason. There is just one other point. Mr. Mitchell says 
(section 2) : — 
“ It is not an accurate representation of the place of reason in religion to 
say that it can originate religious truth for itself. It accepts what is origi- 
nated, revealed, and enforced.” 
