129 
If the existence of a Supreme Being is part of religion — the foundation 
of it — I think that is scarcely a correct statement of the case. I take it 
that belief in the existence of a Supreme Being is one of our funda- 
mental beliefs, the same as our belief in the existence of substance or 
matter. At least, if this truth is not originated by reason, it is difficult to 
conceive how otherwise it could be received. I do not know whether I 
make myself clear, but these observations are only offered in an endeavour 
to bring out the truth. As to what Mr. Titcomb said in reference to the 
testimony of consciousness, I think he missed the point of the argument 
on that question. I think we must admit that the testimony of consciousness 
is our ultimate authority, whether in respect of matters of religion or of 
science, and so Hamilton puts it. If we admit its testimony in one point, 
we must in all ; if we reject it in one point, we have no right to claim respect 
for its authority in any other. The illustration of the feats of a wizard, or 
the tricks of sleight of hand, does not at all refute or invalidate that posi- 
tion, because what consciousness testifies to in that case are simply phenomena, 
and there is no dispute there about the subjective. The only dispute is 
as to the objective, and the adequacy of the senses to discriminate be- 
tween fact and appearance. Then reason comes in to effect that -dis- 
crimination. 
Mr. Titcomb. — I said that consciousness must have reason at the bottom 
of it. The paper speaks of consciousness without speaking of reason. 
Mr. Sinclair. — Yes, but the illustration adduced does not support the 
position of the insufficiency or imperfect authority of consciousness. 
Mr. Titcomb. — I might perhaps mention the case of a ghost as a better 
illustration. A man sees a ghost, and is conscious that he sees it, but his 
reason must be superadded to it to convince him that what he has seen is an 
illusion. 
The Rev. W. J. Irons, D.D. — In offering my thanks to Mr. Mitchell for the 
beautiful essay which he has given us, I must take the opportunity to make, 
incidentally, some remarks on questions raised by Mr. Sinclair. If I understand 
the paper rightly, it makes a distinction between reason and reasoning, iden- 
tical with the doctrine of Plato, who distinguishes between the vorjcng, and 
the didvoia. Ho doubt the vorjcng has relation to the absolute — the abso- 
lutely true and right — the ground where we are able to communicate 
on common principles with our fellow-men ; but we do not say that 
besides the vorjcng there is nothing whatever except the Siavoia, or the 
dialectical or logical faculty ; — far from it. I should, for instance, call the 
belief in substance an immediate inference in reason from the experiences 
of a man, but by no means a consciously logical process. We cannot, 
by any process of reasoning, prove the substance of the external world, 
nor, in fact, perhaps, the Being of God. It is a much more simple 
and direct process by which a conscious being, with the image 
of God stamped on him, finds his Maker, than by reasoning on a set 
of ascertained premises ; and so also it is not by any argument that we can 
prove an external world ; but it is that reason acts directly upon our con- 
