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and philosophical thought of the present day, when all sorts of mediaeval 
questions are coming hack upon us, and the old Kadicals and Tories talk 
about their constitution as Bacon used to talk of the philosopher’s stone. 
The question of intelligo ut credam or credo ut intelligam is really the 
question for the young men of the present day, and we should recognize 
the fact that the difficulties in the solution of that question stop the way to 
some of the highest and noblest truths. (Cheers.) 
Dr. Irons. — May I make an observation upon what Mr. MacClymont has 
said in reference to myself, when alluding to John Stuart Mill. I should be 
most anxious to obviate the thought in his mind that I had any sympathy 
with the philosophy of Mr. Mill. I feel that Mr. Mill’s peculiar difficulty 
was that which he has himself plainly admitted, — that he had not, and knew 
not, that high reason which was Plato’s vorjag • and I think the great lack of 
vogmQ in Mr. Mill’s structure is sufficient to account for his abnormal logic. 
I feel, of course, that his system of logic is full of interesting and suggestive 
matter, but as a system it is most flagrantly imperfect, and must be so, because 
he seems not to recognize that very faculty which must know the first premise 
of any argument. He finds his first premise in any syllogism haphazard. 
He has no discernment — no knowledge. He begins with a plunge, and 
when he has made it, no doubt, he strikes out with considerable intellectual 
muscularity ; but how he finds himself in the stream at all I cannot imagine. 
As to what was said by Mr. MacClymont, almost the same course of thought 
would seem to my mind to meet the difficulty which he has suggested. A 
reasoning man must grapple with the true, the reasonable, and the right, 
and that is external to himself ; otherwise every man is to himself a rule and 
standard of all thought and truth, internally, — which is absurd. He expects 
that which is reasonable in him to be recognized by the reasonable beings 
around him : consequently he directs his mind to some supreme rule above 
him ; which is what Plato refers to. It is a direct motion of the mind instinc- 
tively towards the truth, which is much higher than reasoning ; and that is 
Plato’s vorjtng. 
Dr. Wainwright. — Will you allow me also to add a word. I have 
always made a stand, as a matter of principle, against the religionism of 
some of the speeches that I have had the good fortune to listen to 
here, and I have always taken the side of the scientists against the 
religionists as such. The very fact that I have done so gives me justification 
in saying that I should be sorry to go away to-night thinking that no voice 
of dissent had been raised against what I have understood to be a defence 
of John Stuart Mill in this room. Mr. MacClymont has spoken of the 
importance of not misrepresenting our opponents. I speak in the recollection 
of many present when I say that I have certainly, in one or two instances, 
rendered myself conspicuous by undertaking to put some right in that respect . 
I have the strongest sympathy with Mr. MacClymont’s view as to the 
necessity of apprehending rightly what our opponents say, and my controversy 
is limited to the sentence I have quoted. I say it is thoroughly unscien- 
tific, and utterly unphilosophical to affirm, as J ohn Stuart Mill has done, 
