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this important question. I will now offer a few observations on the subject 
itself. First of all, it seems to me that the principles of Pantheism, so far as 
their moral value is concerned, are plainly undistinguishable from those of 
Atheism. Both are equally wanting in moral power capable of influencing 
mankind. This is deeply impressed upon me by Strauss’s late work. So 
far as any moral obligation, derived from any external source, is concerned, 
that work thoroughly saps it to the foundation. I do not deny that there is 
an internal sense of right and wrong in the human mind, whether a man be 
atheist, pantheist, or theist, and I think that the existence of this is one of 
the proofs upon which Theism rests. No doubt rules of correct morality are 
important, but the all-important point is, by what moral force can we put 
those moral precepts into execution. We may go to the ancient philosophers 
of Greece, and find in the long run a pure set of moral precepts, but they 
themselves most fully confess their positive and absolute powerlessness to 
make those precepts become actualities. No man has read the Ethics of 
Aristotle without feeling most deeply the powerlessness of that philosophy. 
The philosopher investigates the foundation of morals, but he feels himself 
absolutely powerless when dealing with human passions. “Do this thing 
because it is morally beautiful : do not do that thing because it is the con- 
trary” ; but all these precepts are mere chaff before the violence of human 
passions. This is the essential difficulty to be urged against the morality of 
Buddhism, that, denying as it does any external obligation or any external 
power which can be brought to bear on the moral nature of man, it leaves 
him helplessly irreformable. This is exemplified in the morality taught by 
Strauss. Bead his book carefully through, and you will find that he is 
entirely without any possible moral power to bring to bear on the human 
mind. I am not much concerned when I am told that there are many sound 
moral precepts to be found in Buddhism. This is unquestionably the case 
in the philosophy of utilitarianism as taught by Mill. The highest point to 
which he can come is that one is bound to act for the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number ; but how is this to be enforced ? Christianity asserts 
that it possesses such a power as we want, and concentrates it in Our Lord’s 
person, not a mere system of moral precepts which rest upon no distinctive 
moral power to enforce them. The right rev. bishop has brought out the fact 
that Buddhism has no real future for man. I apprehend that Buddhism is 
in this point of view superior to modern atheism and pantheism. According 
to Strauss, when death takes place there is nothing hereafter — we are 
absorbed at once into the infinite universe. The evil and the good alike 
will sleep the sleep of unconsciousness. It is quite obvious that, supposing 
the moral teaching of atheism and pantheism to be good, Christianity must 
have a great additional moral power when it is able to enforce moral obliga- 
tion by the prospect of a future state and a future judge. We Christians 
have this advantage over our opponents : we have all the principles which 
they can bring to bear upon us, and we have others in addition. The 
principles of Buddhism must be preferable to those of Strauss, because 
Buddhism teaches that if a man lives a wretched life, instead of sinking 
