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which we regard as the proper attribute of an infinite Father ; if any one, 
I say, can give me a religion, from whatever source, which has rational 
foundations sufficient to secure my belief, and which possesses these 
characteristics, then I feel that that is what my nature wants ; but I feel 
at the same time that Pantheism, in whatever form, is utterly incapable ot 
this. (Cheers.) Just one word more. We must make our own human 
nature the starting-point of all our reasonings with respect to religion, and 
I think there is no essential difference of opinion between the views con- 
tained in the letter of Professor Chandler and the sentiments embodied m 
this paper. I think there is perfect and substantial agreement between 
them, on the point that our own nature is a moral nature, containing within it 
the essence of the eternal distinction between right and wrong, and of the 
obligation to do right as a starting-point, and consequently conceptions of 
morality and moral principles and rules are possible without religion, but 
what we want is the moral sanction which the paper describes and the 
communication of power to enable us to act upon these rules and discharge 
those obligations ; and here Christianity seems to me to have the most 
undeniable advantages over any other system, whether of philosophy or 
religion, that has ever been founded. (Cheers.) 
Kev. J. W. Buckley. — I wish to say a few words with regard to the 
question of right and wrong, in reference to God’s will. I was startled at 
the statement as to right and wrong being independent of the will of God. 
I see, indeed, a difference between right and wrong ; but is not that 
difference measured by each man’s individual conscience? I cannot 
myself conceive any morality independent of the will of the Supreme 
Being : I cannot understand how otherwise we are to get a rule of right 
and wrong, because any man’s rule may be different from the rule 
of almost everybody else. My natural rule, for instance, would be 
different from the natural rule of a Buddhist. Then I want to know 
what are the natural virtues of which we have been talking ? . Will any 
one undertake to define distinctly what they are ? I take it that the 
estimation of them must differ immensely in different individuals, so that 
I cannot understand what is called an abstract rule of right and wrong. 
For let us suppose that we should all account to one another as to our 
actions being right or wrong. But one man might argue : “ It is a right 
thing, in my view, to take away the life, in a certain state of things, of A, 
B, or C : therefore, I may kill C if I think it right.” That would be 
according to his rule. I do not see, then, how* we can have a rule of 
right and wrong without a reference to some Power supreme over us all, 
in whose wisdom it has lain to decide ' what is to be right and what is 
wrong in this world, between the creations of His own hand. I argue 
thus, irrespectively of Christianity and of Buddhism, as a matter of evident 
truth. I believe there is no such thing as an abstract rule of right and 
wrong amongst mankind apart from the rule of God. You must first know 
whether there is any power to lay down such a rule ; and we cannot get 
any further, without, first of all, doing that. I conceive, that if we went 
