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The following Paper was then read by the Author : — 
THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AS APPLICABLE TO 
CREDIBILITY OF HISTORY. By W. Forsyte, 
Esq., Q.C., LL.D., M.P. 
T O believe without any evidence at all is irrational; but to 
disbelieve against sufficient evidence is equally irrational. 
By sufficient evidence I mean such an amount of proof as 
satisfies an unprejudiced mind beyond all reasonable doubt. 
Mathematical truth alone admits of demonstration. All other 
kinds of truth can only be proved by probabilities, which vary 
in an almost infinite degree, from the faintest kind of pre- 
sumption to what is called moral certainty, which is accepted 
as practically equivalent to demonstration. 
Upon evidence depends all our knowledge of past events; 
and it is astonishing how little is often sufficient to satisfy us. 
The mere fact of its being written in a book is enough to make 
no inconsiderable number of readers believe in the truth of a 
statement, without reflecting whether the author had or had 
not the means of ascertaining the truth; for if he bad, we may 
be justified in putting faith in his honesty ; but if he had not, 
his own assertion is worth nothing. 
By proof I mean anything that serves, either mediately or 
immediately, to convince the mind of the truth or falsehood 
of a fact or proposition ; and proofs differ according to the 
subject-matter of the thing to be proved. 
One of the most common, and, at the same time, most 
satisfactory modes of proof as to things which do not fall 
within the experience of the senses is Induction, by which is 
meant the inference drawn from proved or admitted facts. It 
is for instance by induction that the general facts of Natural 
History are proved. When we say that all ruminant animals 
are cloven-footed, we cannot show any necessary connection 
between these physical phenomena, but having ascertained by 
a very large number of instances that they co-exist, and that ie 
