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which I mean, that our minds stop short of full conviction ; but 
on weighing the evidence or arguments on both sides in oppo- 
site scales, we see that the balance inclines one way more than 
the other, and therefore we are disposed to think that such and 
such a proposition is true. This applies to many of the dis- 
puted facts of history. In his Grammar of Assent, in order to 
show that certitude is the result of arguments which, taken m 
the letter, and not in their full implicit sense, are but proba- 
bilities, Newman takes the case of the following propositions : 
(1 ) That we are absolutely certain that Great Britain is an 
island. But how do we know this ? Those who have 
actually circumnavigated the country have a right to 
be certain ; but which of us has done this, and which 
of us has even met with any one who tells us that he 
has done it? Newman shows by the common argu- 
ments that there would be a manifest reductio ad 
absurdum attached to the notion that we can be 
deceived on such a point as this, but at the same time 
that we are satisfied with proof which is not of the 
highest kind possible. 
(2.) He takes the question of the authorship of the ^Eneid, 
the plays attributed to Terence, and the so-called his- 
tories of Livy and of Tacitus, which the Abbe Har- 
douin maintained w r ere the forgeries of the monks of 
the thirteenth century. We must not forget that our 
knowledge of the ancient classics comes entiiely fiom 
mediaeval copies of them made by monks from manu- 
scripts which now no longer exist. How do we know 
that some of these so-called copies were not actual 
forgeries ? * The strongest argument against such a 
supposition is our disbelief in *the ability of mediaeval 
monks to produce such works; and Newman says, 
justly enough, that an instinctive sense of this and a 
faith in testimony are the sufficient but undeveloped 
argument on which to ground our certitude. To 
faith i.i testimony we must add the absence of dissen- 
tient claims, and this will be found to be one of the 
most cogent reasons for our belief. 
(3.) Newman asks, What are my grounds for thinking that 
I, in my particular case, shall die ? What is the dis- 
tinct evidence on which I allow myself to be certain ? 
Death to me is a future event. How do I know 
that, because all past generations have died, the same 
* “ To foro-e and counterfeit books and father them upon great names has 
been a practice almost as old as letters.”— Bentley’s Dissertation on Phalans. 
