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to view them as the mere result of our experience of 
phenomena. . T , 
11. Of a similar nature must he our idea ot causation. Its 
primary conception is unquestionably derived from our own 
self-consciousness. Experience may aid in its evolution; but 
it is impossible that it can have originated it. All that we can 
have experience of is, a succession of events one following 
the other in which we observe no variation. We advance one 
point beyond experience, when we arrive at the conception of 
an invariable succession. Yet there are innumerable succes- 
sions which are in no sense causes. It may not be possible 
fully to develop the idea in the formal intellect. But we know 
it, we believe in it, we feel it ; it lies at the foundation of our 
12. But further, it is not strictly true, that whenever there is 
an invariable antecedent and consequent, the one is the 
cause of the other : day and night stand to each other m the 
order of an invariable antecedent and consequent, and they 
must have done so from their first origin. Yet the absurdity of 
affirming that the one is the cause of the other is apparent. 
Many instances of invariable antecedents and consequents exist 
which it would be absurd to designate causes. It follows, 
therefore, that a cause must be something more than an ante- 
cedent, followed by an invariable consequent. 
13. Our primary idea of causation has been unquestionably 
derived from our own self-consciousness, and has thence been 
transferred to the forces of external nature. Our conception ot 
ourselves as voluntary originators of actions constitutes our only 
adequate idea of a cause. The consciousness that we are capable 
of originating actions forms one of the highest of our certitudes. 
It is one which is anterior to all reasoning, and forms the 
groundwork of its possibility. We know that our volition 
sets an entire chain of antecedents and consequents m action. 
We are certain that they derived their impulse from a volun- 
tary act of our own, without which they would have had no 
14. Let me- illustrate this by an example. Let us suppose a 
city to be blown to pieces by applying a match to a barrel ot 
powder in a large magazine. It is incorrect to say that the 
match is the cause of the explosion. The true cause was the 
voluntary act of the agent who applied the match. No other 
of the agencies adequately satisfies the idea. _ But are the 
other unconscious forces which bear their part m the work ot 
destruction nothing else but bare antecedents and conse- 
sequents ? Does it satisfy our conception of a physical force. 
