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in inferring, because the sun has risen every day of our past 
lives, that it will rise again to morrow ? It has been urged 
that our experience of the past, and that of others, justifies us 
in inferring that the future will be like the past; that the past 
events of our lives were once future, and that from their having 
taken place, we are justified in inferring that similar ones will 
take place hereafter. 
26. It is evident that this belief does not m any respect 
participate in an axiomatic character. The contrary of it is 
quite conceivable. Thus we are fully able to conceive the 
possibility that the sun may not rise to-morrow ; though we feel 
perfectly certain that it will. So firm is our conviction that 
events, under precisely similar circumstances, will reproduce 
themselves, that it forms the foundation on which all human 
activity rests. 
27. Is it possible, then, that our experience that past events 
have repeated themselves under similar conditions, can account 
for our belief that they will do so in the future ? I ask, to what 
does experience extend? We have had experience of past 
events. As what was once future has gradually become the 
present, we have seen events, which once were future, repeat 
themselves. But how can this justify us in arriving -at the 
conclusion that nature is uniform, and that they must continue 
to do so? Our belief that they will do so is an inference, and 
cannot therefore be founded on experience alone. Some 
principle, distinct from it, must exist in the mind, which 
justifies us in arriving at this conclusion. 
28. Nor can it be arrived at by any process of deductive 
reasoning. No premiss can be found, resting on any self- 
evident principle, which can justify the conclusion that the 
future must, under similar conditions, resemble the past. . 
29. Let us recur to the example, that the sun will rise to- 
morrow. How do we know this? The answer which this philo- 
sophy gives, is that we believe it, because we have had experience 
that it has always done so; and that our experience has 
reached to the point that what was once future has become 
past. But this can say nothing as to a future which has not 
yet become past. Now, it is both conceivable and possible, 
despite of any amount of past experience, that the sun may not 
rise again to-morrow ; or, to put the same truth in general 
terms, that the blind forces of nature may suddenly or 
gradually cease to repeat themselves. . . 
30. If the first man who saw the sun rise had been m lull 
possession of his reasoning powers, it is evident that from seeing 
it rise once, he could have drawn no inference as to what it 
