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capable of producing such results on a very diminutive scale, 
and after long intervals of time. Yet, the principle of chance is 
largely invoked in aid of the theories of this philosophy ; though 
all experience affirms that it is incapable of producing the 
results in question, 
37. The all-important fact to be observed is that, 
as far as experience goes, lucky chances have no tendency 
to repeat themselves. On the contrary, the occurrence of 
one once . is a reason why we should expect it not to 
occur again. Whenever such a result takes place fre= 
queutly, we cannot help inferring that this must be due to the 
intervention of mind. Let us take an example. If we were 
to throw up twelve dice into the air at hap-hazard, it is possible, 
though in the highest degree improbable, that they might all 
fall with their aces uppermost. But if the operation were 
repeated one hundred times, and the same result followed, there 
is no one who is capable of understanding the operation who 
would not draw the conclusion that the dice were heavily 
loaded as the highest of certitudes. The case is precisely 
similar with respect to the order and adaptations of nature!. 
They are not only numerous but innumerable. It follows, 
therefore, that nature in every part is loaded heavily, and that 
that which loads it is the Divine mind.* 
I am quite aware if twelve dice should fall with their aces uppermost, 
tiiat, mathematically speaking, it is quite as probable that they would do so a 
second tune, supposing the operation to be repeated under precisely similar 
conditions. Just in the same way, if a person held twenty bonds in a 
foreign loan, of which there were annual drawings, if one of these should 
be drawn, the chance that one or all of the remaining nineteen would be 
drawn at any subsequent year would be equally good, and would be entirely 
unaffected by the drawing of tbe twentieth. This, however, in no way 
affects my argument, which is founded entirely on experience and fact. 
1 here can be no doubt that if twelve dice were thrown up into the air, and 
they tell one hundred times in succession with their aces uppermost, every 
SS ? SS i^ °^i comtnon seil se would consider it the greatest of certitudes 
that foul play had been had recourse to ; or in other words, he would 
actribute the result, not to the action of blind forces or laws, but to the 
presence of intelligence. The same remark is true respecting the bonds. If 
a particular bondholder were to draw a prize at every drawing, and others 
never, the inference would be arrived at, that the whole matter was managed 
dishonestly, and had resulted, not from the action of blind forces acting 
according to invariable laws, but from fraudulent intelligence. In a simila? 
manner, when order and adaptation are the result of the action of natural 
are brought about by these forces intersecting one another at the 
ng ime and place, the inference is no less certain, that such results 
cannot be due to the action of a number of blind forces, but to intelligence, 
inose against whom I am reasoning profess to found their philosophy on an 
ultimate basis of fact and experience. I reply to it by a conclusive appeal 
to the same principle. 
X 2 
