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attack or defence ; and here there needs, what is too often wanting, a 
thorough understanding of the adversary’s stand-point, his arguments, and 
conclusions, with a manifest disposition to do justice both to him and to his 
views : not to aim at a mere argumentative triumph ; not to take advantage 
of any accidental slip or error in his ratiocination ; rather to place the 
position combated in the best light of which it is susceptible : not to trust 
too much to the argument ex concesso or ad hominem. The cause may be 
right, though the pleading be weak ; and, in fact, the good cause has 
suffered far more from its friends than from its assailants. In a word, to 
seek truth, and we are told to seek peace, as to ensue it, impartially, if 
not dispassionately. 
“ And, when all is done, any belief in God worth contending for. must, 
in my judgment, rest upon a ground of faith. There must be a suitable 
attitude and energy of the will , — a moral element, which cannot and ought 
not to be eliminated. 
“ It may be added, that the most telling arguments against the truth of 
religion, whether natural or revealed, — that is to say, Scriptural, — lie out of 
the domain of physics. They are either metaphysical, or, much more 
commonly, of a moral nature, and appeal to the conscience. It is with these 
that we have mainly to deal. 
“ Mr. Row’s assault upon the Darwinian hypothesis is very powerful ; 
and it is remarkable that one strong objection, — want of time, — has been 
anticipated, but not answered, by Darwin himself. But the question is not 
vital, however Strauss may have regarded it. Whatever the process may 
be, the result is not less admirable, nor the original less divine. Such 
inquiries into the course of nature may be examined with entire equanimity. 
The mystery of creation is not hereby solved, nor the divine truth any way 
compromised. 
“ As regards causation, my impression is that J ohn S. Mill was latterly 
opposed to Comte on this point, and that he recognized a true causality. 
Anyhow, I entirely agree with the lecturer. 
“ I am, &c., 
“ Derwent Coleridge, M.A., Prebendary of St. Paul’s.” 
The Rev. Prebendary Griffiths says : — 
“ April 10th, 1874. 
“ Sir, — I regret that I am unable to be present at the reading of Mr. Row’s 
paper, but avail myself of your invitation to give utterance to some 
thoughts of which it is suggestive. 
“I. — And first. The quotations from Strauss appear to me striking 
instances of what I conceive to be the fundamental fallacy which pervades 
the whole school of thought of which he constitutes himself the mouthpiece ; 
namely, the deluded and delusive worship of mere empty words. With 
them, as Caro says, ‘ les mots prennent la place des 6tres ; l’axiome Nomina 
Numina est a la lettre une v6rit6 pour ces nouvelles 4coles.’ Thus we find 
them substituting adjectives for substantives ; relations of things for things 
related ; appearances for things apparent. 
“ 1. Take their first principle (paper, sec. 9), that ‘all our knowledge is 
merely phenomenal.’ This very fact, instead of justifying our stopping 
short at the phenomenal, suggests, and by the laws of our mind obliges, the 
recognition of things — realities — underlying this phenomenal. For ‘phe- 
nomenal ’ is an adjective, and' ‘ phenomena ’ equally an adjectival term, has 
no meaning till you supply the suppressed substantives. And these sub- 
stantives force themselves on our notice from two different sides ; you must 
complete the phrase by the admission of an object or objects of which 
