306 
phenomena are phenomenal, and of a subject or subjects to which they are 
phenomenal. The images in a mirror are phenomenal ; but they, by the 
very force of the word, imply objects of which they are the reflection, and a 
subject to whom they reflect their objects. To'speak of 4 phenomena’ taken 
alone is as absurd as it would be to speak of 4 greennesses ’ instead of things 
green. And universally, a 4 phenomenal ’ world does not exclude, but by the 
very adjectival nature of the term implies and demands, the recognition of 
noil-phenomenal realities which present these phenomena to a. reality which 
perceives them. 4 No appearance without reality,’ is a principle which 
Herbart has thoroughly established in his Hauptpunkte der Metaph. and 
throughout his works. 
44 2. A similar sophism runs through Strauss’s words in (paper, sec. 43). 
4 We must regard the creation as the laboratory of the reasonable and the 
good.’ The phrase is perfectly empty, unless you fill it up with its proper 
contents, 4 reasonable and good things' And reasonable and good things can 
have their origin only in a reasonable and good person of whom they are the 
emanation, and who has (to use Strauss’s own words) 4 a disposition to the 
reasonable and the good.’ 
44 3. Again, when it is affirmed (paper, sec. 56) that life is 4 nothing but a, 
form of motion,’ the question immediately presents itself, 4 but what is 
motion ? ’ Motion is not a thing per se, but simply a term expressing a 
relation of things — a state of relation between things. It implies therefore 
and demands the recognition of things (entities) existing in certain relations 
to each other, the changes in which relations are manifested to us in the form 
of motion. There must be life, or lives, existent, in order to present to our 
eyes this 4 form’ or these varying ‘forms’ of existence which we designate as 
4 motion.’ 
44 In short, on this whole subject M. Caro’s answer to M. Taine is 
irresistible : 4 Qu’on essaye de concevoir ce que serait un fait s’il n’y avait 
pas d’Ures , un phenomene s’il n’y avait pas d’ existences. 4 Nous ne saississons,’ 
dit M. Taine, 4 que des couleurs, des sons, des resistances, des mouvements.’ 
Mais la couleur, le son, la resistance, le mouvement, voila certes les plus 
inintelligibles des abstractions si vous n’entendez pas guelque chose qui est 
colore, sonore, mfi et resistant, ou bien encore si vous ne concevez pas ce 
rapport particulier entre telle chose exterieure et le moi qui constitue la 
sensation de couleur, de son, de mouvement, et de resistance.’ (Caro, l’ Idee 
de Dieu, p. 165.) 
« IX. In regard to the theory of Evolution, I hold that it has as much 
consistency with Theism as any notions of 4 creation ’ hitherto held. For 
4 Evolution ’ seems to me only a wider generalization, from wider premisses, 
of the notion of production. And it matters not through how many or how 
few stages this production runs. Our views of the mode of production must 
vary with our insight into the processes of nature ; but the fact of production 
remains the same. All processes, mediate or immediate, are still the processes 
of an ever-present and originative Deity. God always is. 4 My father 
works without intermission up to this present moment, and I similarly so 
work.’ The vis genetrix (the Father) and the vis formativa (the Son) are 
constants (John v. 17). . . 
HP Once more I would suggest, m connection with sections 98, 9y, 
that it seems to me a hasty assumption of our opponents, too generally con- 
ceded that 4 Personality ’ involves of necessity the antithesis between self 
and not-self ; the predication of 4 1 ’ in conscious distinction from 4 not I ’ 
(sec. 98). Animals have clearly this distinction ; they are individuals, and 
feel* themselves to be individuals as much as we do ; yet animals have not 
what w T e mean by Personality. The essence of Personality I am disposed to 
place (with I. H. Fichte, who has elaborated the point) in the power of self- 
