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attendant upon a series of changes and chances ; and that when a good change 
is made which produces an improvement, divine power should he always 
ready to pick up the change which opportunity thus offers, and to perpetuate 
it for the future. All this theory seems to me so very illogical that I cannot 
conceive how it is that persons of intelligence can he satisfied with it. 
But it is not atheism, nor is it pantheism, although to my mind it is some- 
thing more like polytheism than either. 
Mr. C adman Jones. — There is only one point to which I should like to 
call attention, and that is a mathematical one with which I happen to he 
familiar. There has been brought forward here what all mathematicians 
would pronounce to be a mathematical heresy. It occurs twice,— first m the 
37th paragraph, where it is stated that, “ as far as experience goes, lucky 
chances have no tendency to repeat themselves. On the contrary, the 
legitimate inference is that the occurrence of one once, is a reason why we 
should expect it not to occur again.” Then it is repeated in the 83rd 
paragraph, “ We know, as a matter of fact, that the occurrence of one lucky 
chance is a reason for expecting it not to occur again.” Now, accordmg to 
the theory of chances, let us take the instance of twelve dice, and suppose 
that they were perfectly fair, so that on an average each die would bring up 
its ace once in six throws. If they fell all aces at the first throw there would 
be no reason, from its happening that time, why it should not be just as likely 
to happen again upon the next throw. It is a most improbable event that 
they should turn up all aces, but, assuming the dice fair, whatever the proba- 
bility was at the first throw there is just the same probability at the second. 
The only way in which the fact that they all came up aces the first time 
bears upon the probability that they will all come up aces on the second 
throw, is that it raises an inference that they were loaded. On this ground 
if a certain contingency happens once, it is rather more likely then that it 
will happen a second time than it was before the .first occasion. If it 
happens several times successively, the probability is considerably mcreased. 
I notice this point, because I think Mr. Eow is pushing the argument a 
little further than he ought when he states that the occurrence of a lucky 
chance is a reason for expecting it not to repeat itself. 
The Bev. Prebendary Irons, D.D. -Would not that entirely change the con- 
ditions of the probability ? When Mr. Jones assumes that directly the dice 
have fallen in the manner suggested, he should come to the conclusion that 
they were plugged, or not fair dice, he changes his hypothesis at once. I 
require him to keep his hypothesis as it was, that the dice should be fair 
dice, and that they should fall in the way suggested, and then I think the 
doctrine of chances would be rather against him.-I must express my sense 
of obligation to Mr. Row, whose paper is full of thought, though it does not 
pretend to exhaust the whole subject. We are bound to recognize thankfully 
that it will enable all persons who care to do so, to reason out many parts of 
Strauss’s metaphysics, in a way that no other paper which I have seen has 
yet done. With reference to the general subject, I think the fact is a 
startling and painful one, that such a philosophical theory as that of Strauss 
