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carried out to its logical consequences, leads to the absurd. 
Consider, for example, the words of John Stuart Mill, in 
book i. ch. 3, of his Logic, “ Everything is a feeling of which 
the mind is conscious.” What is true in this assertion is what 
is above admitted, namely, that all being, so far as known by 
us, appears to us, i.e., is known in tlio forms, under the con- 
ditions, by the means, which are peculiar to human cognition 
(truismatic as this may sound). I do not inquire whether it 
be a correct use of terms to identify consciousness with feeling — ■ 
virtually to define the one by the other. But the whole and only 
truth of the expression cited (as far as it concerns the point 
immediately under consideration) is, that all our knowledge of 
the real must, to be possessed by us, be a part of our indi- 
vidual consciousness. But to affirm that this is the whole 
truth of the case, is to identify the part with the whole, the 
aspect with that of which we perceive the aspect, or (better) 
the form with the content, and the appearance with that which 
appears. It is true that our metaphysical knowledge (know- 
ledge of the “ real”) does not come to us through the medium 
of demonstration. Like all that is ultimate, it is simply appre- 
hended, is acquired and recognized directly, and can be con- 
firmed by indirect demonstration alone. But the testimony of 
consciousness to its reality is ever present, and furnishes the 
one conclusive answer and corrective to statements like that 
now under criticism. Hume showed that the logical issue of 
such a principle is philosophical scepticism ; and it is substan- 
tially this to which Mr. Mill himself is led. (See his Examination 
of the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, chs. xi. and xii.) 
But the considerations, by which philosophical scepticism is 
shown to be absurd, are too familiar to need to be re-stated. 
All knowledge consisting in ideas, it is a work of both 
psychological and metaphysical analysis to answer (in the 
second place) the metaphysical question as to the ideas which 
represent or are the medium of knowledge of the real, on the 
one hand, and of the phenomena], on the other; as also to 
show what knowledge is direct, and what indirect. In the 
case of indirect knowledge, we are obliged to resort for con- 
firmation to logical criteria of truth, or to processes (obser- 
vation and experiment) guided by logical rules. 
Pre-eminently, and in the first place, our knowledge of 
reality is knowledge of ourselves, furnished in direct conscious- 
ness. A long line of thinkers, among whose names are 
included the illustrious ones of St. Augustine and Descartes, 
have called attention to our direct consciousness of our own 
existence, as providing the immovable starting-point and 
foundation for all true (ontological) knowledge. Differences 
