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selves as ideal existences. We can advance in our attempts to 
cognize the real which is not ourselves, only by the way of 
analogy, because of the unknown we can frame no conception, 
except in terms of the known. The results of our attempts, 
being inferential, will command an assent less absolute than 
that which is due to truths of which consciousness is the 
immediate voucher. 
By analogy we form for ourselves most easily conceptions 
of the ideal nature of organized, living beings, other than our- 
selves. Thus, without difficulty, we represent to ourselves in 
imagination the inward life of our fellow-men, and then, by 
a process of de-idealization, that of inferior animals. By a 
reverse process of idealization we conceive of intelligent 
existence superior to ourselves. (Cf., in Ueberweg’s History 
of Philosophy , vol. ii., the section on Beneke, more especially 
pp. 284, 285, and Ueberweg’s Logic , § 42.) So, then, we 
know our own ideal being directly, and we infer that of other 
beings, more or less like ourselves, from signs, the meaning 
of which no one calls in question. And this is the only kind 
of being of which we can truly be said to have intrinsic 
knowledge. 
Besides, ideal, conscious existence, as above set forth, 
science has been in the habit of treating of the universe as 
containing “matter” and physical “force.” To these mate- 
rialism reduces the world, and it treats the two as inseparable. 
They belong for us primarily to the province of the pheno- 
menal. They arc, in the first place, ideas; and whatever 
reality or being corresponds to them can be known only 
through a transference to them (positively or negatively) of 
the analogy of our own ideal being. 
First, as to matter. In the definition of this conception we 
are compelled to use terms which imply force, such as impene- 
trability, power of resistance. It is only these terms which 
throw the least semblance of light into our idea of matter ; 
extension, form, and the like, are expressions which say 
nothing on the subject of intrinsic, constitutive nature. Accord- 
ingly, philosophers and scientists have sought to identify 
matter with force or motion, but without success. Professor 
Trendelenburg, notably, who made of motion the hypothetical 
principle of nature and of cognition for the physical realm, 
had to confess his inability to reduce matter to motion. Nor 
will inductive science admit the theory that matter (atoms) 
consists simply of forces concentrated in a mathematical point. 
Says Professor F. Schneider, in Meyer’s Jahrhuch for 1873, 
p. 583: “The theory that the atoms have no extension in 
space and aro merely centres of forco .... is, in view of the 
