189 
explains as much of the phenomena as is explicable.” That 
is, laiv, which states the how, tells all that can be known or 
with probability inferred respecting the Jciw-giver, or the 
whence and whither ! What should be shown, in order to 
justify the materialistic hypothesis, is, that, supposing matter 
to exist and to possess ab ceterno and inalienably the forces 
above mentioned, these forces by their blind action would 
necessarily bring into existence the world as we know it. 
How far this is from having been accomplished, no one familiar 
with the results and confessions of natural science needs to be 
informed, and the above citations from Mr. Lewes may serve 
to show how far from conclusive are the arguments employed 
to accomplish it.* And the insufficiency of the materialistic 
theory becomes still more palpable when confronted with the 
facts of conscious mind. True as it may be, that, at least for 
us, mind and a material substrate of mind are correlative and 
mutually dependent, yet we have the, in this instance, signifi- 
cant authority of Mr. Herbert Spencer for the assertion that 
“ we remain utterly incapable of seeing, or even of imagining, 
how the two are related.” {Psychology , new ed. § 56.) In like 
manner, Du Bois-Reymond, a man attached to materialistic 
explanations, affirms (in the address above cited) that not 
only the nature of matter, but also that of consciousness, is a 
riddle which must for ever remain insoluble for the physical 
investigator (p. 34). 
Still another hypothesis, which is less blind to actual facts 
than is materialism, but which yet fails to fulfil the conditions 
of a satisfactory theory of the character and mode of operation 
of nature’s forces, is that of an unconscious principle of reason 
in nature, manifesting itself chiefly or solely under the form of 
will (Schopenhauer), or as (unconscious) will and intellect 
combined (Eduard von Hartmann). Hartmann’s Philosophy 
of the Unconscious, in particular, deserves notice, since the 
work thus entitled is undoubtedly the great philosophical sen- 
sation of the present quarter-century in Germany, and the 
publisher of it announces preparations in progress for its 
publication in various languages — among others, in English, 
at Boston, United States. Hartmann admits most fully and 
* I may be allowed, in this connection, to refer to the work by Dr. Her- 
mann Ulrici, of Halle, entitled Gott und die Natur (Leipzig, 1862 ; a second 
enlarged edition has since appeared), in which, on the ground of a most.com- 
prehensive examination of the best accredited authorities in positive science, 
the untenableness of materialistic hypotheses is demonstrated, and God is 
shown to be the “ necessary postulate of natural science.” A translation of 
this work into English would, I am sure, subserve most efficiently the ends 
which the Victoria Institute proposes to itself, 
VOL. IX. P 
