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depend upon an assumption of such a principle of resemblance ; therefore, 
that is the first thing to lay down. Then when we look around, in order to 
discover marks of intelligence in creation, we see in the first instance, 
symmetry, proportion, order, and the like. These we know do, in human 
productions, indicate design and purpose, and therefore, by the principle of 
resemblance and analogy, we conclude that these outward works, on the face 
of nature, indicate the existence of purpose and design. That is the first 
manner in which we observe intelligence. Then when we proceed to 
examine more distinctly the metaphysical argument by which men arrive 
at the doctrine of final causes, or in other words, at the belief that the world 
came into being with a purpose and design guiding it, we must start from 
the known to the unknown. We observe in the first instance, that in doing 
this we must pursue the metaphysical argument, because physical science will 
furnish us with no ground for judgment on the point. Physical science is 
the observation of the laws of phenomena, the gathering together of a certain 
number of facts to be accounted for by a certain hypothesis. But we do not 
get at all nearer true cause because we have discovered the law. Take 
gravitation ; an apple falls to the ground because there is gravitation : that 
is not the real cause, it is only a law. It is simply the observation of a 
law, and if we could go further back and find what produces gravitation, we 
should not be necessarily nearer the real cause. If we are to come to any 
knowledge of real causes, w r e must start from the known, and the only 
thing of which we have direct knowledge is the existence of our own con- 
scious being. I know that I exist, I know that I act with a purpose, and 
that I am able to a certain degree effectually to carry out that purpose. 
That is known, that is positive, that is certain. From this then I can infer 
by analogy (that analogy which supposes a resemblance between the action 
and motives of beings), that other persons constituted like myself, act from 
like purposes, and so on. Therefore I can, by indirect knowledge, or by 
inference, gather information with regard to the principles of action, of 
persons like myself. But then, I may carry that out further and regard 
the actions of beings unlike myself in some particulars. In estimating their 
actions, I must consider some of the particulars in which they differ, and so 
far as I can estimate these differences, I may be able to discover from what 
I observe in myself, a good deal with regard to their principles of action. 
I may apply that to higher beings, and even to a Supreme Being. Taking 
into consideration what I observe with regard to my own action, and my 
own powers, I may add to that what I conceive of an Almighty Being. In 
this way I may arrive at a conclusion with regard to His action, and looking 
at the world around me, I discover by analogy signs of final cause, that is 
of a purpose, or of a design in creation. Then, if I go further, I observe 
the complex character of my own being, the great ends which I and 
those like me are capable of attaining ; this observation strengthens and 
supports the hypothesis, that all was created with a purpose and a design. 
That is the hypothesis of final causes. This seems to me to be the general 
purpose of the paper, and in such an argument Scriptural proof has no 
