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the wish of the author to meet the metaphysical men of science on their own 
ground, by means of scientific and metaphysical comment. The paper shows, 
I think, that Professor Morris is a master of his craft as a metaphysician. 
He has shown us, and I venture to think that it adds some value to his 
paper, that a Christian writer can be conversant with all the modern ideas 
on the subject, whether in England or Germany. I confess a difficulty in 
regard to the failure of nature, but I think it has been met in the only way 
in which it could be met — argumentatively, and very ably. It appears to 
me it is met, as far as human reason can pretend to deal with these things, 
in a satisfactory way, by the suggestions contained in this paper. In truth, 
his argument is this — that, whether or not the object is fully obtained, — 
there is clearly a purpose, clearly an idea,— and the mere presence of an idea 
itself necessitates the admission of a guiding and an overruling mind. Then 
he says in regard to the main failures : ‘‘Is not the idea in the whole brought 
out, that these very failures are parts of the whole process — parts of one 
entire law, which is to be exemplified by means of this vast nature, of which 
God is the mind and of which God furnishes the controlling force ?” His 
assertion is, that it does not imply there is a defect in the whole because 
there is an apparent defect here and there. While he answers the objection 
in this manner, and contends that the great result and meaning and idea 
does emerge, he turns round and says, the mere fact that there is a type you 
cannot deny — a law you recognise as such, proves this is not mere blind 
force and mere unconscious struggling. And it is not merely this ; he 
contends that the mere fact that there are types and ideas, whether at one 
moment fully realized or embodied, or not, proves that there is mind in the 
whole, and not mere matter. Then I must say also that I quite believe and 
feel persuaded that science could not be studied — could not be developed, — 
unless there were continually underneath, an assumption, more or less 
metaphysical. If we come to analyze, we find that the statement of the 
commonest laws of science involves a metaphysical assumption — a metaphy- 
sical hypothesis, and that we could not put knowledge into any form by 
which it could be conveyed to another person’s mind without such an 
assumption. Therefore you cannot attempt to deal with science, or criticise, 
or expound science, unless along with the whole of it you have a cognisance 
of the fact that there is a perpetual assumption of metaphysical ideas. And, 
no doubt, in that assumption of metaphysical ideas consists a great deal of the 
plausibility with which distinguished scientists have so misled us. There is a 
perpetual assumption of metaphysical ideas favourable to their own views, and 
by such an assumption they put into the premises what they mean to bring out 
in the conclusion. If we take the law of induction itself, which tells us to go 
to knowledge first-hand, whenever we can get it, — if we go on the principle of 
induction, the confusion and the assumptions of metaphysical scientists show 
that what does not harmonize with orthodox religion is false induction, after 
all. If we keep all our theories in harmony with the truths of our conscious- 
ness, as the first things we know, and if we will but deal with the facts of 
science on the basis of these truths of consciousness, instead of being led to 
