324 
The “ Nature 
of each parti- 
cular object ” 
fails, as Mr. 
Mill defines it; 
included in the definition of “Nature in the abstract," — “con- 
sciousness," “capabilities,” and “causes which produce phenomena” 
being indefinitely conceded, so as to include apparently everything, 
(even “ Religion," or the desire for one, if it existed anywhere) — 
(p. 5). This is explained a little farther on (p. 6), as being “ not 
so much the multitudinous detail of the phenomena, as t\\e concep- 
tion which might be formed of their manner of existence, as a 
mental whole, by a mind possessing a complete knowledge of 
them." This then would seem to be unattainable by man. 
6. The “ Nature of a particular object," and also “ Nature 
in the abstract," being thus defined, we should 
next have expected some exact application of 
these two definitions to the critical purpose of the 
inquiry. It is to be observed at once, however, that 
these definitions provide for no use of the term “ Nature " as an 
abstract term applying to any number of particular things which 
have, (as a little Socratic questioning here would have shown), 
what the world takes to be some Nature in common.* The two 
definitions given provide only for each “ particular thing," and 
for the universal “abstraction”; yet the only illustration of his 
definitions which Mr. Mill proceeds to give is one which suits 
neither of them, and only suits that which he omits. “ It is," he 
says, “ a law of the Nature of water, that under the mean pres- 
sure of the atmosphere at the level of the sea, it boils at 212° Fah- 
renheit.” If he means by this, that it is a “ law of the nature of all 
water," what is this but indirectly admitting common nature to 
many waters, each in itself a “ particular object " or “ thing," with 
this in “common"? — A further endeavour to supplement the first 
definition of the “ nature of each particular object,” 
by here adding the idea expressed by the unex- 
plained word “ Law," is useless, because all the modes 
in which each particular thing “ acts ” are, in both 
cases, previously included in the very wide definition of its 
“ Nature " (p. 5). 
7. Not only does Mr. Mill’s definition of the “ Nature of each 
particular object" thus fail, however, in his own 
chosen illustration, which requires a recognition of a 
Nature common to several objects , but the broad 
definition of “ Nature in the abstract " proves also 
to be equally unpractical ; and so we have an emenda- 
tion of it as early as possible. 
adverting (p. 7) to “ the phenomena produced by 
Human agency,” Mr. Mill proposes, (and feels 
not provi- 
ding for “com- 
mon natures” : 
hence his first 
dilemma. 
“The abstract 
idea of nature,” 
as expressed by 
Mr. Mill, also 
fails to serve 
the purpose of 
the argument, 
After 
obliged 
to 
* Take a sentence, for instance, which every one understands, “ a 
touch of Nature makes the whole world kin ” ; Mr. Mill’s definitions of 
“Nature” will give us no assistance in treating of such pervading “Nature. ” 
