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do so), further to recognize two principal meanings in the 
word “ Nature ” even as an “ abstraction. 1,1 “ In one sense 
Nature means all the powers existing in either the outer or 
the inner world, and everything which takes place by means of 
those powers. In another sense it means not every- an( i nee ds 
thing which happens, but only what takes place subdivision; 
without the agency, or without the voluntary and intentional 
agency of Man.” This is inserted easily by Mr. Mill, as though 
we all knew that the “Voluntary and intentional agency” of man 
were an admitted part of his philosophy — which, however, he 
quite neglects. After this new complication of his definition of 
“Nature in the abstract,” (separating “Man” from “Nature” 
in a way approaching to Bacon’s more logical division), Mr. Mill 
proceeds (p. 9) to inquire, whether the word Nature is used in 
either of his two senses, when “Moral obligation” is 
connected with it? In other words, this is actually even * then "be 
to inquire whether his own definitions, or any of them, Moral 
are available in the practical questions before him ? 
He finds, and owns, that the philosophy and jurisprudence of 
the world adopt the rule of “ following Nature ” in some way, as 
good in morals and politics. All thinkers before him, (as they 
would decline the theory, for instance, that water may “ run 
uphill,’’) declined, on the principle of “ following Nature,” to 
impose on mankind, as Duty, what was repugnant to their 
“ Nature ” in its best, that is its truest, condition. 
Yet our author, in the midst of this consensus coifddfiemma^ 
against him, still prepares boldly to question the 
“ Sequi Nat u ram.’ 1 We must let him do it then in his own 
way, for he is apparently in great straits. 
It is difficult to understand — and we cannot help saying so 
even now — what Mr. Mill would have us follow, if not Nature; 
for, according to the “ definitions,” whatever we do is a follow- 
ing of our own particular Nature ; and our own particular Nature 
(be we “ things,’’ “ objects,” or “ conscious beings ”), is part of 
the “ aggregate,” or “ Nature in the abstract.” But how, pro- 
perly speaking, can we choose to follow at all ? — Let us try, 
however, to follow Mr. Mill. 
8. Mr. Mill’s purely speculative definitions, as thus put before 
us, seem indeed, by this time, to have bewildered him. It might 
have been otherwise had he kept at all to that “ Socratic 
method ” which he promised us (p. 2). Let us see : Socrates 
would have probably begun by asking his hearer Mr Min , s 
various questions of his own practical experience, to failure com. 
bring out the actual use and meaning, or meanings, socratic ana- 
of this word “ Nature.” He would have taken lysls- 
examples. He would have asked, for instance, whether men 
are said to have the same “ Nature” as animals ? or how far ? 
