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of all things. Now this is Mr. Mill’s method. Let us place it in 
contrast with Bacon’s or Cuvier’s carefulness when they define. 
{See also Cicero , De Nat. D., and Aristotle, Eth. ad Nic.) 
10. Take Cuvier first; He writes thus; — “Dans notre 
langue, et dans la plupart des autres, le mot Nature signifie : 
tantdt les proprietes qu’un etre tient de naissance, Cuvier, 
par opposition a celle qu’il peut devoir a Part ; tantot enfin 
les lois qui rcgissent ces etres. C’est surtout dans ce dernier sens que 
l’on acoutume de personifier la Nature, et d’employer par respect 
son nom pour celui de son Auteur.” Every one must recognize 
at once the simplicity, penetration, and genuine reverence of this, 
and is prepared to follow the ensuing distinctions of that chapter 
of Cuvier, {on Methods ), as clearly as if each paragraph had been 
elicited and confirmed in extenso as it might have been by that 
Socratic questioning of phenomena and uses, which Mr. Mill 
promised and did not give. The line is drawn between the 
Nature of a being, and the Artificial acquirements of that being ; 
then we are taught to observe the laws which regulate beings ; 
and finally reach the abstraction, or, as Cuvier says, the personifi- 
cation, which may be regarded as in some sense including the 
whole. 
11. Lord Bacon, as an example not likely to be questioned, 
may come next. In the Sum of the Second Part of Eacon 
his Novum Organum, he writes thus, in the true 
spirit of that Sequi Naturam which Mr. Mill cannot understand ; 
“ Homo, Naturae minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit 
quantum de Naturae ordine re vel menteobservaverit ; necamplius 
scit aut potest.” Here, again, is the genuine ring, the true echo 
of all science and all philosophy since man began to think of his 
condition and its surroundings. Bacon, again, in one brief 
sentence tersely condenses a kind of philosophy of the relative 
terms Cause and Law, thus ; “ Natura enim non nisi parendo 
vincitur ; et quod in contemplatione instar causae est, id in 
operatione instar regular est.” 
Such writing belongs, too clearly, to another order of mind 
than Mr. Mill’s. If every reader is conscious that Bacon states 
truths sublimely and with transparent simplicity; and if Cuvier 
lays it before us logically, Mr. Mill’s strange stumbling in defi- 
nition is beyond all that could have been expected by any one 
who had thought of him either as a worthy opponent or a 
respectable ally. 
12. We are warned, as we now proceed, to look back, and note 
how our author’s “definitions” are alternately used and Mr. Mill’s 
neglected, even as though he had not grasped'their ui^o^defi- 
significance himself. He is now about to neglect them nitions. 
again. Plis d priori dogmatism, indeed, never forsakes him ; in 
