329 
Without it 
Mr. Mill could 
not proceed to 
his object in 
this Essay. 
But there is a still further complication of definition, as he 
writer advances towards his object. Enlarging on the “ ambit 
guity ” of the term Nature, (as if that might be a constant shield 
for looseness of definitions), Mr. Mill finds easy occasion to 
modify, or seem to modify, what he had so confidently laid 
down. 
14. “ The two senses of the word Nature in the abstract ” 
(p. 12), which had been supposed, “ agreed in refer- 
ring only to what is,” — in contradistinction from 
what ought to be ! In the first of these meanings, as 
Mr. Mill now repeats, “ Nature is a collective name for 
every thing which is. In the second, it is a name for 
every thing which is of itself, without Voluntary human interven- 
tion.” “ But,” he continues, “ the employment of the word 
Nature as a term of ethics seems to disclose a third meaning, in 
which Nature does not stand for what is, but for what ought to 
be ; or for the rule or standard of what ought to be.” But what 
is this “ought to be”? He remarks, —that after all is not really 
a third meaning of the word. It is only intended by it, that 
“ what is (p. 13), constitutes the rule and standard of what 
ought to be — the examination of this notion being the object of 
the Essay.” He insists, however, that the definitions which 
have gone before are his mainstay, and, altogether are to be 
considered as the indispensable preliminaries to his work. 
15. How inconsistent with each other these really are, how 
incongruous and even self-contradictory, we have perhaps suf- 
ficiently seen ; and how contrary also to the mind of all 
philosophy, and to the rules of logic. But we The « segui 
shall have to follow somewhat further their incohe- denied" ”by Mr S 
rencies ; for the conclusions to be ultimately arrived at Mill. 
are now said to be that, (1) viewing Nature as a whole including 
Man, there is absolutely no meaning whatever in bid- And that ^ 
ding him to “follow Nature” ; and that (2) viewing bothhissenses 
Nature as a whole without including man, it is im- ° u 
moral as well as irrational to require him to “ follow Nature.” 
As a comment on the “ first view ” of Nature, which we must 
first notice, Mr. Mill says, “ to bid people conform to the laws of 
Nature, when they have no poiuer but what the laws of Nature 
gave them — when it is a physical impossibility for them to do 
the smallest thing otherwise than through some law of Nature, 
is an absurdity ” (p. 16). 
16. Here the immediate inquiry might naturally be, Does 
Mr. Mill, in this somewhat guarded sentence, accept 
the position that man is not real cause ? Or had lie diiemma'as to 
made up his mind as to which view he would adopt of e .. t J° t s ®" c s !f 
as the true hypothesis of “ Nature”? We are any- 
thing but sure that he finally had done so. Utrum hornm ? Is 
