334 
Mr. Mill, then, and writers of his views, never appear to place 
themselves in the mental attitude which at all contemplates the 
pras-phenomenal ; and yet, undeniably, if for the mere working 
of the problem we hypothesize a Perfect Cause of the universe, 
He must be supremely prae-phenomenal. The materialist’s 
notion of previous Omnipotence in the Self-existent having the 
phenomenal as basis is a contradiction ; and so this sensualistic 
theory of “ will ” identified with “ preference,” (even as a hesi- 
tating balance of phenomena,) is a denial of that Perfect or Abso- 
lute Good, on the existence of which the co-existing pheno- 
menals are depending. If, indeed, a created conscious being, 
gifted for an instant with phenomenal omnipotence and will, (a 
kind of contradiction), could be supposed, Mr. Mill’s alternative 
might perhaps, be apprehended, and there might seem place for 
the difficulty as put by him; and, we must add, by materialists 
and predestinarian writers generally. 
(Aquinas’s treatise, if it may be so called, cle Potentid , is an 
endeavour to state the impossibility of attributing to the Supreme 
that kind of Potentia which the Averrbistic ontology perhaps 
required. The Schools generally expressed the Divine power as 
“pure act,” and identify Will with the Good. The distinction has 
been observed in various ways by every philosophy from Par- 
menides to the de Principiis of Origen, and from him to Leibnitz 
and Berkeley.) 
24. But this confusion of the absolute and the mechanical 
is less surprising in Mr. Mill than the Moral confusion 
which, of course, next ensues. “Nature” with him “is 
every thing,” and so nothing is or can be “ contrary 
to Nature” ! Surely, it was needless, then, for a logician to have 
defended the “ unnatural,” for, according to this, it does not and 
cannot exist. The very definition of Nature as the totality of 
the Universe, precludes it. If Nature really meant “ every thing 
that is” — both what Air. Alill pleases to blame as “evil,” or 
speculate on as “ good ” — it is plain that no one ever adopted 
the rule “ Sequi Naturam,” and Air. Alill was simply, per- 
haps unawares, fighting a shadow. None among those who 
He misstates 
the rule “Sequi 
Naturam.” 
have regarded Nature 
ft 
as 
a guide, have conceived that we are to 
“ follow every thing that is.” Of course, had there been any one 
— which we cannot suppose — who accepted Air. Mill’s self- 
contradictions as definitions and premisses, he might perhaps 
be ready to endorse the conclusion, which no one else would do 
(p. 62), that conformity to Nature has no “ connexion what- 
ever with right and wrong.” Moral philosophy speaks otherwise. 
The Christian hypothesis is, that Nature, or whatever God 
made, “ He saw to be very Good” as lie made it : niETHlirn 
