342 
a 
With a pos- 
sible exception 
in favour of a 
“Religion of 
Humanity.” 
temporal welfare of mankind ? ” This he finally determines in 
the negative, only reserving a doubt in behalf of what he calls 
Religion of Humanity” (p. 108), which must be mechanical, 
and yet is love of country, developing into love of race, which 
he thinks is more than a morality, being founded on “ large and 
wise views of the good of the whole, neither sacrificing the 
individual to the aggregate nor the aggregate to the individual.” 
He explains this possible Religion of Humanity best perhaps 
in the following sentences : “ The essence of Religion 
is the strong and earliest direction of the emotions and 
desires towards an ideal object, recognized as of the 
highest excellence, and as rightfully paramount over 
all selfish objects of desire. This condition is fulfilled by the 
Religion of Humanity in as eminent a degree, and in as high a 
sense, as by the Supernatural Religions, even in their best 
manifestations ” (p. 109). Again : “ Apart from all dogmatic 
belief, there is for those who need it an ample domain in the 
region of the imagination, with possibilities, with hypotheses 
which cannot be known to be false” (p. 117). Of this scoffed-at 
Religion of Humanity which may or may not be “ Natural,” a 
future life is no part ; nor even the being of God, — except possibly 
on some Manichaean hypothesis (p. 116). Is free volition in it? 
37. In discussing his subject, Mr. Mill follows, as he says, 
„ .. , verv largely in the footsteps of Jeremy Bentham and 
Bentham and J ° A tt 1 
comte are foi- Auguste Comte. He treats ]t briefly, both in its 
social and individual aspect. He acknowledges, at 
once, the deplorable condition to which men would be reduced if 
virtue were not taught and vice repressed, publicly and privately, 
by the praise and blame, reasonable or not, of mankind. But he 
observes that Religion receives too much of the credit of teaching 
all the morals of the world. Authority and tradition, he insists, 
even if not religious, are “all-powerful with the immense majority 
of mankind.” He quotes, as good, the telling words of Novalis : 
“ My belief has gained infinitely to me, from the moment when 
one other human being has begun to believe the same.” Then 
education, he rightly adds, is a “ tremendous power” ; (and none, 
surely, could have more reason to urge both these considerations 
than our essayist). His words on early education, and the com- 
parison of their powerful hold on us with the “investigations” 
of later life, have a solemn pathos, like an involuntarily uttered 
secret of the soul, which could not be restrained (p. 81). 
38. He imagines, further, that the needful Authority, and an 
Educational tradition for the many might be attained eventually 
by the supposed “ Religion of Humanity ” gaining possession of 
the heart of “those who need it,”— of whom Mr. Mill does not 
profess to be one. It seems to him perhaps a weakness. 
