351 
as an abstract idea, misled him. A “changeetiZe element,” (or, 
as we said, “ variable cause”), is that, (he allows), which “begins 
the existence” of an object (p. 143); but it should surely be also 
termed a “ change-making element,” and then the logical fallacy 
would be plainer ; but to call it “ change,” simply, is of course 
inaccurate in the highest degree. Again, no one supposes all 
so-called “causes” to be, or to affect, what Mr. Mill calls 
“ permanent elements ” in Nature itself. A cause in nature 
itself may be so far “ permanent ” as to move the changes in one 
particular way ; yet it may be interfered with. But of course, 
where Volition, which is variable, exists in a cause, (and experience 
does not forbid the hypothesis), the action of that “ cause ” 
may vary very largely. The same reflections must guide us, 
when we deal with “ permanent elements ” of Nature — if their 
assumption be not frequently a petitio principii. A permanent 
or invariable acting element is not an abstraction. 
49. The same mistake, of taking an abstract idea for a dis- 
occurrence in 
when, a little farther on, he adds 
(p. 145), “ The First Cause can be no other than 
Force.” If he had not printed “ force” with a capital letter, 
and had said, what alone his sentence could mean, “ the First 
Cause can be no other than that which first forces,” he would 
have seen that he was not telling us much. It is simply A = A. 
It is the more surprising that he should have thus written, 
because in the very next paragraph (p. 146) he acknowledges a 
“ possible Cause of force,” strangely forgetting that if, according 
to his statement, “ the First Cause could be no other than 
force” he is thus suggesting a “possible cause of the First 
Cause,” — which is absurd ; and surrendering his distinction of 
the permanent Nature, and the changeable. 
The self-contradiction of Mr. Mill is, however, still more com- 
plete even than this. “ Volition,” he says, (apparently without 
the idea), “ does not answer to the idea 
tinct individual being, is of constant 
Mr. Mill ; as when, a little farther 
Further in- 
accurate use of 
abstraction. 
conceiving 
of a first cause, since force must in every instance 
be assumed as prior to it ” ; force “ being evolved ” 
Self-contra- 
diction of the 
argument. 
in certain “ processes ” of the phenomena ! And yet, his 
“First cause is no other than Force,” and “Force has 
all the attributes of a thing eternal and uncreated.” — What 
are we to say to such writing? Some respect for the memory of 
a great name seems to forbid further comment. The essayist, 
evidently, had not thought of volition, except as of some “ agent 
in the material universe,” and he is hopelessly puzzled in mere 
“ Abstractions,” (“Causation,” “Volition,” “Force”), — which 
he alternately takes up and lays down, as we foretold. 
2 b 2 
