ii6 j- Z>. Wilson’s Anfwer to the 
Sir Isaac newton, perceiving too well this pronenefs to> 
lyftem, has laid down his fourth rule of philofophizing, that 
arguments of induction may not be evaded by hypothecs. It 
will become us, therefore,, in all things, and in the prel'ent 
l'ubjeft in particular,, to have refpeft to fo excellent a precept. 
In fpeaking hereafter of the folar fpots, . let us feparate what, 
things claim to be heard as matters of fadt from what reft 
upon the fandy foundations of mere theory, and no longer, 
confound them together,. 
Since upon this topic, F humbly beg the indulgence of the 
reader whilft I advert to a certain abufe of terms, which is but 
too prevalent in books of philofophy, both in our own country, 
and upon the continent. What I have to fay relates to this 
word hypothefis. “ Quicquid enim non deducitur ex phamo- 
“ menis hypothecs vocanda eft,*’ are the words of Sir Isaac 
newton in his general fcholium. And yet real difcoveries, 
founded upon the beft induction, are fometimes mentioned by 
the appellation of fuch and fuch a one’s hypothecs. I have 
often thought, that this impropriety of language owes its con- 
nuance to the force of cuftom, and that it is one of thofe 
badges we ftill retain of that difgraceful ftate philofophy lay 
under before the aera of experiment and obfervation, when 
almoft every thing was hypothefis and theory both in name 
and in reality. 
Moft kind of hypothefis regards true philofophy with fo 
unfriendly an afpeft, that we fhould be careful at leaft not to- 
contaminate matter of fact and' certain truth with fo inaufpi- 
cious a denomination. I would alfo remark, that none which 
do not carry with them great marks of probability fhould be 
brought into view, even in the way of hints or queries, for 
fuggefting further, experiments and obfervations ; and that far 
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