446 
ОТЧЕТЪ О ТРИДЦАТЬ СЕДЬМОМЪ ПРИСУЖДЕНІИ 
It was Count Capodistria’s purpose to state to us in the forms of private 
intercourse, wliat appeared to him the rnost expédient mode amidst number- 
less difficulties of meeting the present exigency. He had recovered his usual 
composure, and referred to the disappointment, wliich had agitated him 
the day before, only as the ground work of his argument in unfolding his 
ideas. It is fair to add tliat even in mentioning General Guilleminot and 
repeating his suspicion as to the cause of tliat Ambassador’s absence, he 
declared tliat His Excellency had by no means encouraged him to reckon 
lipon the immédiate advance of General Maison’ s Army into Attica. 
The count’s idea was simply this: To prevail on General Maison to 
allow a small detachment of his force, two Companies of Artillery for in- 
stance, two Squadrons of Cavalry, and, if possible a battalion or two of in- 
fantry, to pass at once into the Greek Service, constituting a centre round 
wliich he might form his irregulär troop and take up a more decided position 
in Attica, tlian he could venture to do with the irregulars alone, unprovided 
with eitlier Cavalry or Artillery. 
He grounded his hope of success on two circumstances; first tliat the 
French Government had sometime before consented througb its agent at 
Aegina to allow him to recruit for the Greek Service in France, and to 
furnish from the King’s stores the necessary equipment for the volunteers; 
secondly tliat General Maison, not heilig able to realize the expectation 
wliich he had hehl out, was bound to do his utmost to obviate the consé- 
quence of tliat disappointment. He argued tliat the present inapplicability 
of the French Army in the Morea to any service beyond the Isthmus of 
Corinth, gave him a Claim upon France for the execution of tliat promise 
wliich had been superseded with respect to the Morea by the expédition 
from Toulon and tliat the Commander of the French Troops would best con- 
sult the interest of his Army, and of the Country to wliich it belonged, by 
detaching a part of it as speedily as possible from the unhealthy position 
of Navarino. 
That General Maison sliould accédé without Orders to a proposai of this 
nature, I conceive to be quite chimerical. A sentiment of unfeigned concern 
for the difficulties and painful embarassment of the President’s situation 
restrained me from expressing this opinion in broad terms. I only requested 
His Excellency to consider whether the object in view could not be attained 
by means of a more obvious description — wliat was that object? Not cer- 
tainly to take the Citadel of Athens; for such an enterprize would require 
a larger force tlian General Maison could possibly make over to the Greek 
Government according to the plan proposed, were he ever so well inclined 
and empowered to meet the wishes of the President. The only conceivable 
