OF THE BRUTE CREATION. 
665 
From these facts we come to the conclusion, seeing that there is 
quite enough of similarity and approximation in the brains of ani- 
mals to our own, that animals were intended to be acted on by a 
principle the same in kind as our own. This, you perceive, in- 
volves doctrines of infinite consequence; for, if the intellectual 
phenomena of man require an immaterial principle superadded to 
the brain, we must equally concede it to the brute creation ; many 
of which, we have already seen, exhibit manifestations differing 
only in degree from some of the human: and the only method by 
which we can get rid of this argument will be by maintaining, with 
the materialist, that all the phenomena of life and mind result en- 
tirely from bodily structure. 
Well, for the sake of argument, suppose we yield for a moment 
to the sceptic the position, that the mind is a material substance, 
and cannot exist but in connexion with a material form, — what 
will he gain by the concession! Why, only this, that, if his doc- 
trine be the true one, it matters very little whether the brutes are 
constituted differently from ourselves or not ; since, according to his 
own opinions of the nature of the living principle, it must neces- 
sarily follow that the soul of a brute is as good as his own. Or, 
again, suppose we allow to another set of philosophers, by way 
of argument, that all the actions of animals are instinctive, which, 
properly speaking, may be said to be an involuntary desire or 
aversion, acting on the mind without the intervention of reason, 
motive, or deliberation; then “ observe that there are only two essen- 
tial substances in all nature, spirit and matter. In which of these 
two substances, does this instinct reside! If it exists in matter 
only, unconnected with spiritual substance, it would be mere 
matter operating on matter. All motion refers to some agent, su- 
preme or subordinate. No effect can be produced independent of 
an antecedent and efficient cause. Animal nature exhibits an 
endless variety of motions. If there is no spiritual substance in 
animal nature, then by what is it actuated! Is animal nature, in- 
dependent of spirit, able to move! If there are motions peculiar 
to animal nature, and which no other material object manifests, 
then there must be a corresponding principle producing them, other- 
wise we admit an effect without any adequate cause, which would 
be a perfect absurdity. If there is not a spiritual active principle 
in animals, then instinct, with all their senses and members, would 
be useless. If there were no such principle to influence the eyes, 
the ears, the brain would be as blind and as deaf as a stone. 
However perfectly organized any body may be, whether brute or 
human, yet, independent of spirit, mind, or soul, it cannot realize 
any outward object. You may speak, but it cannot hear; you 
may hold up the most pleasant object, but it cannot see. Now, 
