480 The Fall of the Confederacy. 
and Robert Lee. The Southern climate was to decimate 
the Northern armies, but the yellow fever did not appear, 
and probably never did invading armies suffer so little 
from pestilence. It was supposed that England would be 
so crippled by the loss of her cotton trade that she would 
be goaded into intervention, but though there was dis- 
tress in Lancashire, the total trade of the country in- 
creased, and the war that was to have impoverished, added 
to the wealth of England. 
We have by no means exhausted the list of mistakes. It 
is not to be denied that in respect to the Confederacy the 
opinions of statesmen, public writers, and military critics 
were erroneous. We are wise after the event, but what is 
the use of history if we are not to be instructed by it? 
Yes; but it may be asked of what use is history if it does 
not offer more certain instruction than it did in respect to 
the Confederate war? If others were mistaken why do 
we especially blame the Confederate administration ? 
This is our reply. We complain that the Confederate ad- 
ministration paid no heed to the lessons of history ; and we 
assert that if the condition of affairs had been as well 
known to Europe as it was to the Confederate adminis- 
tration there would have been few believers in the success 
of the Confederacy, even in the heyday of her prosperity. 
It is then no excuse for the Confederate administration 
that the conclusions of foreigners were wrong. The con- 
clusions of Europe were false because the suggested pre- 
mises were false. Nor is this all. It is possible that in 1862 
Europe might have thought that the Confederacy had a 
chance of success, even if the true state of affairs had 
been known; but no one would have. done so if the 
policy of the Confederate administration had been 
foreshadowed. Whether the Confederacy could possibly 
have succeeded may be an open question, but we think it 
can be shown that with the policy adopted by the Con- 
federate administration failure was inevitable. We repeat 
that it concerns the honour of the South and of the North, 
the welfare of the United States, and must interest all 
peoples to investigate the cause of the fall of the Con- 
federacy, for nothing can be more injurious and more 
unfounded than the assumption that the catastrophe was 
immediately and solely due to the superior numbers of 
the North. We assume that despite the numerical 
‘superiority of the North the Confederacy had a chance of 
life, at least of a longer life than four years.. How was 
