540 The Fall of the Confederacy. 
- growing party was in favour of letting the South go. Not 
that this party dreamt of an actual and final dissolution 
of the Union. It was known that in every Southern State 
perhaps, except one, there was a powerful Union party, and 
it was supposed that a separation would be temporary, 
and that in a few years, probably in less than a Pre- 
sidential term, North and South would be again under one 
general government. Nor was this supposition unreason- 
able. Notwithstanding the excitement incident to revolu- 
tion, the wirepullers and managers of the secession 
movement had to resort to innumerable manceuvres to 
secure majorities. Flying election cavalry was employed, 
so that the same votes were recorded at half-a-dozen- 
booths in succession. The most positive assurances were 
given to the pro-unionists that secession was only a protest 
to save the Union. Pro-secessionists were assured with 
equal positiveness that England and France were pledged to 
an offensive and defensive alliance. Still there were formid- 
able minorities voting against secession; and in every 
State there were numbers who would not vote. The 
smallest concession on the part of the North would have 
converted the neutrals into active ogponents of secession ; 
and it is not doubtful that in most of the States their adhe- 
sion would have changed the pro-union minority into a large 
majority. Added to this the Secession Camp was crowded 
with waverers. Many who voted for secession did it as a 
kind of protest, and with no idea of setting up a rival 
power to the cherished Union. It was, therefore, we say, 
not unreasonable for the North to suppose that a separa- 
tion would be temporary. 
Even the temporary separation was not to be a virtual 
dismemberment of the Union. There were to be two pre- 
sidents and two congresses, but an identical commercial 
and foreign policy. Fora few years in lieu of a union of 
States there was to be a union of Federations. Likely 
enough, if secession had been accomplished on any terms, 
the disunion would have been lasting. But the Northern 
party in favour of letting the South go did not believe 
it, and hence that party was, before the fall of Fort Sumter, 
strong and daily increasing in strength. 
Mr. Lincoln appreciated the position. When he took 
the oaths of office there was not a war party, or if so it was 
too small to avow itself. Therefore the extreme caution 
that marked his inaugural address. The Southern States 
had seceded, but he did not intimate any intention of using’ 
