The Fall of the Confederacy. 543 
by the Abolitionists and the peace-men, were such 
as would have been distasteful to the Confederate 
leaders. The theory was that the separation was to 
be exclusively domestic, and that before the world North 
and South were still to be one. Two Presidents, two- 
congresses, but one tariff, one army, one navy, one flag, and 
one foreign department. During the war, a letter was 
published, written by a distinguished Abolitionist, con- 
demning the conduct of England in recognizing the 
Confederacy as a belligerent power, and asserting that even 
if the South prevailed and the North formally acknow- 
ledged the independence of the Confederacy, England 
ought not to do so. This seemed very absurd to those 
who were ignorant of the peculiar views that had been, 
and were, entertained about secession; but in the moment 
of the deepest gloom, and when many were in favour of 
letting the South depart, it was still thought that the 
_ separation would be merely domestic. The Confederate 
Administration were aware of this sentiment, but with blind 
impetuosity they denounced it, and in words of pride and 
bitterness, they scornfully rejected the suggestion of a 
separation that did not involve the setting up of a rival 
power to the United States. Who cannot see that a 
separation on any terms could, if the South had desired it, 
have been, after a few years, changed into an unconditional 
separation? But we say that if, despite the impolitic 
rejection of the idea of conditional separation, the Con- 
federate Government had maintained a pacific attitude, the 
Abolitionists would have been clamorous for an uncon- 
ditional separation, rather than the South should re-enter 
the Union with the institution of negro slavery intact. 
There was another fear that was upon all parties in the 
me in March, 1861. It was an article of popular faith 
both |in the North and in the South that Europe—and 
Europe meant England, and most likely France and 
Spain,—would be delighted with the breaking up of the 
Union, and that if the South seceded the European Powers 
would joyfully accept an offensive and defensive alliance. 
That was dreaded as a mortal blow to the supremacy 
of the revered Union. Therefore, in March, 1861, there 
was a tacit and universal agreement that nothing should be 
done to incense the South and to induce her to listen to the 
overtures of Europe. The cry of “no coercion” was heard 
on every side. Now, if the Confederate Government had 
waited for a few weeks the suspense would have rendered 
