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546 The Fall of the Confederacy. 
temporary, and only a domestic separation, became, 
on the instant, staunch and uncompromising oppo- 
nents of secession, when they saw that secession meant 
the setting-up of a rival power. Those who had been 
opposed to coercion, lest the South should be forced 
into an alliance with Europe, suddenly perceived that the 
only sure way to prevent the intervention of Europe, was 
to keep the South in the Union. The business-men were 
aghast at the probability of a rival power that would insti- 
tute rival tariffs, which might for many years deprive the 
North of the rich commerce of the South. So longas the 
Confederate Administration maintained a pacific attitude, 
it was, or seemed to be, the interest of all parties at the 
North, not to oppose secession by force. As soon as the 
South fired a gun, it was, or seemed to be, the interest of 
all parties at the North to fight for the union of North and 
South. When the rash act of the Confederate Adminis- 
tration opened the eyes of the Northern people, their 
excitement was intensified by perceiving how nearly they 
had escaped consenting to the establishment of a rival 
power, and to the utter blighting of the fond hope of 
Continental dominion. , 
How can we explain such a monstrous and fatal blunder 
on the part of the Confederate Administration? An 
enemy and detractor might suggest that they rushed into 
war because it was the only way to hinder the Unionists 
in the South returning to the Union, and that unless 
separated bya river of human blood, North and South 
could not be kept asunder. We reject such an explanation. 
It would be scandalous to impute such an atrocious motive 
to the Confederate Administration. We cannot solve the 
problem. We cannot imagine a plausible excuse for such 
manifest and disastrous folly. 
We can hardly conceive that men who had passed their 
lives in the political arena of the United States, were be- 
_ guiled by the moderation of Mr. Lincolns’s Inaugural, and 
by the pacific disposition of the North, and therefore con- 
cluded that such a people as the people of the North were, 
to be terrified and subdued by a display of force. And if the 
Southern leaders had consulted historical precedents, they 
would have learnt that only those revolutions have suc- 
ceeded which resorted to war in the last extremity. When 
on two occasions the people of England triumphed over 
their Stuart kings, their patience was most conspicuous. It 
was particularly so in the great rebellion which resulted in 
