The Fall of the Confederacy. 597 
until every effort had been made to preserve the integrity 
of the Empire. Beyond this there were special reasons 
for Northern determination. The Confederates declared 
that they would fight to the bitter end, and that, if neces- 
sary, the war should be continued for many years. The 
North never credited these assertions. The lookers on in 
Europe were amused with Secretary Seward’s frequent and 
positive announcements that the war would be over in 60 or 
go days. Yet Mr. Seward in this only expressed the gene- 
ral opinion of the Northern people. At the beginning they 
did not contemplate a long or costiy contention, and 
throughout the war it was supposed that each enrolment 
and each campaign was to be the last. The Revolution was 
so hurried that the North never believed in it, but felt con- 
fident they had to deal with a conspiracy only that kept 
down the hereditary Unionism of the South. 
Further, to give up the South was to resign the dearest 
hope and to disappoint the strongest passion of the nation. 
Every citizen of the United States called himself an Ame- 
rican. Southern gentlemen were not less frequently than 
Northern gentlemen chosen to represent the Union at 
foreign courts. Did they evince any dislike to the dream 
or prospect of continental ascendancy? On the contrary, 
igporing the fact that there were other American govern- 
ments represented at the foreign courts to which they 
were accredited, they, the representatives of the Washing- 
ton government, adopted the style of “The American 
Minister.’ All sections, all parties, all conditions of men 
accepted and fostered the grand and pleasing idea of con- 
tinental dominion, the idea which found expression in the 
so-called Monroe doctrine. Why, if there had been no 
other motive—if, unlike all other peoples, the people of the 
United States had been disposed to part with territory 
without fighting for it until exhausted—this passion for and 
hope of continental dominion would have prevented them 
from so doing. 
Nevertheless it is evident that the Confederate adminis- 
tration thought it a possible eventuality that the North 
would give in. There was no attempt to husband means 
and to protract the war; the resources of the country 
being lavished on a few campaigns. The supplies of mate- 
riel and of men were straitly limited, yet neither were 
spared. A Fabian policy was eschewed, and battles were 
fought in which victory must be barren except so far as it 
produced a moral effect. The motives of this policy were 
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