fir the CwCular Sterna fiSUps of War. Si 
Where a general similarity of construction prevails, it is im- 
possible to derive any information from comparison. No ad^ 
vantage^ for example, could be derived from comparing the 
square stern of one vessel with the square stern of another, sup- 
posing equal skill to have been employed in their construction. 
But we may arrive at some satisfactory information, by contrast- 
ing the strength and firmness of structures oi different forms, — 
the sti’ength of the stern of a ship, for example, with that of the 
stem. It may indeed be urged, in opposition to such a compa- 
rison, that, independent of the dissimilarity of form which at 
■present actually exists between the stem and the stern, the du- 
ties which they are destined respectively to perform are so very 
opposite to each other, that nothing satisfactory could be hoped 
for from the comparison. The dissimilarity of form, and the 
difference in the respective offices of the parts just alluded to, 
will be immediately admitted. But if it should appear on exa- 
mination, and by an appeal to authentic documents, that a weak- 
ness in the stern is much more common than in the bow, then 
will both these objections be fairly disposed of, and a superiority 
in the formation of the bow over th§t of the stern will be the 
necessary consequence. 
To enable us to institute this comparison in tlie most satisfac- 
tory and perfect manner. Sir Robert Seppings, in the first Ap- 
pendix'to his able Letter, has furnished above 120 examples 
of ships of different classes, the sterns of which have been made 
the subject oZ frequent and strong complaint by their respective 
commanders. Tq increase the value and importance of these 
documents, it is worthy of observation, that they have not been 
collected from any very limited portion of time, or when any 
particular feeling in favour of a change of form might have ex- 
isted in the navy, but during a period of nearly a quarter of a 
century, aod through the trying services of a long and active 
war, and when the attention of every naval officer was necessa- 
rily directed to the actual state of the ship he commanded. 
These evidences, alsoj it may be farther observed, in favour of 
the weakness of the square stern, have been selected from a mul- 
titude of other official reports of the same kind, drawn up by 
and experienced officers, placed in circumstances of a very 
varied and difficult nature, and with no other object in view 
