696 
be at all material to the purposes of this report is District of Columbia 
v. Lynham,® decided February 7, 1900. The case arose under the 
provisions of an act relating to the adulteration of foods and drugs 
in the District of Columbia, approved February 17, 1898, * & and the 
particular question submitted for decision was whether the defendant, 
a druggist, charged with the sale of a drug adulterated within the 
meaning of the act, was entitled to acquittal upon showing that he 
was at the time of sale ignorant of the composition of the substance 
sold. The court says: 
In the trial of a prosecution under this statute it is incumbent upon the Dis- 
trict of Columbia, in whose name the prosecution is conducted, to prove the sale 
and delivery of the medicine or drug by the defendant, or his possession thereof 
for purpose of sale, and that the same was adulterated within the meaning of 
the statute. The prosecution upon such proof makes out a prima facie case of 
guilt against the defendant; and it is no defense for the defendant to show 
simply that he was at the time of sale, or of possession for sale, ignorant of the 
fact of such adulteration of the drug or medicine. He must know what he sells, 
or proposes to sell, and that it conforms to the standard prescribed by law. As 
a registered druggist, he holds himself out to the/ public as being sufficiently 
skilled to know and understand of what constituents or ingredients the drugs 
and medicines that he offers for sale are composed, and especially in respect to 
all such drugs and medicines as are recognized and described in the Pharma- 
copoeia. It is not in his mouth to say, when it is shown that the drug was 
impure or adulterated at the time of sale, that he was ignorant of the fact. If 
such defense could be allowed, there would be no protection to the public against 
impurities and adulterations of drugs and foods. 
The second case to be decided, Weigand v. District of Columbia, 0 
decided November 5, 1903, involved, among other things, the applica- 
tion of the principle enunciated in District of Columbia v. Lynham 
(supra) . It involved also the construction of “An act to regulate the 
sale of milk in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes,” 
approved March 2, 1895, d and of “An act relating to the adulteration 
of foods and drugs in the District of Columbia,” approved February 
17, 1898. 6 Weigand had been convicted in the police court of selling 
adulterated milk, to wit, milk containing less than 3J per cent of 
butter fat. He had sought to show by evidence, and to have the jury 
instructed, that the provision of the act of Congress of 1898, pre- 
scribing the standard of milk for sale in the District of Columbia, was 
unreasonable and oppressive, and therefore void. But the court said : 
To declare an act of Congress unreasonable and oppressive, and therefore 
void, is a power that the courts can not exercise, except where the provision 
of the statute is shown to be plainly violative of some provision of the Consti- 
® 16 Appeals, D. C., 185. 
6 30 Stats., 246. 
c 22 Appeals, D. C., 559. 
a 28 Stats., 709. 
