697 
tution. The subject-matter of the act of 1S98 is plainly within the power of 
Congress, and the courts can not amend or modify any of the provisions of 
that act so as to bring them within what may seem to be reasonable bounds. 
They can not examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or im- 
politic. Considerations of that nature must, in general, be addressed to the 
legislature. Questions of policy determined there are conclusive with the 
courts. (License cases, 5 Wall., 462, 475.) If, by the plain words of an act of 
Congress, an impossible thing was required to be done, or some thing done in 
an impossible manner (if such legislation could be rationally supposed to 
occur), in such case the courts would have no alternative but to declare the 
statute to be incapable of enforcement in the particular case. But statutes 
are not to be declared void because of difficulty of construction, or because of 
apparent hardship in their application ; nor are the plain words of a statute 
to be refused their application upon any theory that a more reasonable pro- 
vision could have been adopted for the state of case presented. All statutes 
must receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative in- 
tention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. 
(Law Ow Bow v. United States, 144 U. S., 47, 59 ; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 
213.) It is true a municipal ordinance professed to be passed under a general 
or implied power given by a statute must be reasonable and lawful, and not 
oppressive, and if it be not so it will be declared void. But this is upon the 
presumption that the legislature did not intend by the general terms of the 
statute to authorize the making of such an ordinance. (1 Dill., Mun. Corp., sec. 
319; Cooley, Const. Lim., 192, 193, 6th ed.) And it has therefore been held that 
an ordinance can not be held to be unreasonable and void which is expressly 
authorized by the legislature. (Coal Float v. The City of Jefferson, 112 Ind., 
15; Cooley, Const. Lim., 241.) 
In this case the offer was made to show, and the court was requested 
to declare, not that the act of Congress required milk to conform to an 
impossible standard or test, or that the milk offered for sale should con- 
tain constituents that nature did not supply, but that the standard pre- 
scribed was unreasonably high, and could not by ordinary care be maintained 
through all seasons of the year. There may be difficulty in keeping up the 
standard throughout the year, and more expense and greater effort may be 
required at some seasons of the year than at others. But the very object 
of the statute was to require this more than ordinary expense and labor, on the 
part of the owner of cows, to keep up and maintain the prescribed standard 
of milk when necessary ; and this is accomplished by proper care of and food 
supplied to the animals producing the milk. For it is well known that the 
quality and richness of milk depend largely upon the condition of the animal, 
the care with which it is kept, and the kind and quantity of food supplied to it. 
It is not attempted to be shown that 3£ per cent of fat, as a constituent of good 
milk, is greater than can be supplied by proper care of, and good and abundant 
food supplied to, the cows. If the proposition of the defendant were sustained, 
the question of the reasonableness of the statute would be one of fact for the 
jury, and we should likely have different juries determining the question in 
different ways. We think the court was clearly right in its ruling upon this 
question, and in holding that the question, whether the standard of milk pre- 
scribed by the statute was reasonable or not, was not open to inquiry on the 
trial. 
In the police court Weigand had been denied, too, the right to. 
show by evidence the specific purpose for which he had in his pos- 
