765 
copceia. It is not in his mouth to say, when it is shown that the drug was 
impure or adulterated at the time of sale, that he was ignorant of the fact. If 
such defense could be allowed, there would be no protection to the public against 
impurities and adulterations of drugs and foods. 
The second case to be decided, Weigand v. District of Columbia, 0 
decided November 5, 1903, involved, among other things, the applica- 
tion of the principle enunciated in District of Columbia v. Lvnham 
(supra). It involved also the construction of “An act to regulate the 
sale of milk in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes,” 
approved March 2, 1895, * 6 and of “An act relating to the adulteration 
of foods and drugs in the District of Columbia,” approved February 
17, 1898. c Weigand had been convicted in the police court of selling 
adulterated milk, to wit, milk containing less than 3J per cent of 
butter fat. He had sought to show by evidence, and to have the jury 
instructed, that the provision of the act of Congress of 1898, pre- 
scribing the standard of milk for sale in the District of Columbia, 
was unreasonable and oppressive, and therefore void. But the court 
said: 
To declare an act of Congress unreasonable and oppressive, and therefore 
void, is a power that the courts can not exercise, except where the provision 
of the statute is shown to be plainly violative of some provision of the Consti- 
tution. The subject-matter of the act of 1898 is plainly within the power of 
Congress, and the courts can not amend or modify any of the provisions of that 
act so as to bring them within w'hat may seem to be reasonable bounds. They 
can not examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or impolitic. 
Considerations of that nature musl, in general, be addressed to the legislature. 
Questions of policy determined there are conclusive with the courts. (License 
cases, 5 Wall., 462, 475.) If, by the plain words of an act of Congress, an im- 
possible thing was required to be done, or some thing done in an impossible 
manner (if such legislation could be rationally supposed to occur), in such case 
the courts would have no alternative but to declare the statute to be incapable 
of enforcement in the particular case. But statutes are not to be declared void 
because of difficulty of construction, or because of apparent hardship in their 
application ; nor are the plain words of a statute to be refused their application 
upon any theory that a more reasonable provision could have been adopted for 
the state of case presented. All statutes must receive a sensible construction, 
such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid 
an unjust or an absurd conclusion. (Law Ow Bow v. United States, 144 U. S., 
47, 59; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 213.) It is true a municipal ordinance 
professed to be passed under a general or implied power given by a statute must 
be reasonable and lawful, and not oppressive, and if it be not so it will be 
declared void. But this is upon the presumption that the legislature did not 
intend by the general terms of the statute to authorize the making of such an 
ordinance. (1 Dill., Mun. Corp., sec. 319; Cooley, Const. Lim., 192, 193, 6th ed.) 
And it has therefore been held that an ordinance can not be held to be unreason- 
able and void which is expressly authorized by the legislature. (Coal Float v. 
The City of Jefferson, 112 Ind., 15; Cooley, Const. Lim., 241.) 
° 2Z Appeals, D. C., 559. 
6 28 Stats., 709. 
* 30 Stats., 246, 
