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BULLETIN OF DENISON UNIVERSITY. 
sciousness reveals its content in two forms, active and passive — sub- 
jective and objective — distinctions which likewise are immediate in 
experience, though upon them rests the whole superstructure of psy- 
chology. 
‘‘Self,” as subject-object with its active and passive phases ex- 
pressed in volo BJidpatior — the latter further analyzed by psychology 
into reflexive and independent, sensibilitas and intellectus, giving us the 
familiar trinity, will, susceptibility and intellect — must be the starting 
point for every excursus into the realm of being. 
It must be admitted, however, that the criticism of Ulrici upon this point 
is valid, 
Ulrici’s argument may be condensed as follows, chiefly in his own words: 
The simplest reflection convinces that the idealistic principle — thought and 
its necessities — constitutes the cause and therefore the only starting point of 
philosophy. 
I have also shown that this intellectual necessity implies, or is rather 
founded upon, the second or realistic factor of human knowledge, i. e. the activ- 
ity of a real being. Indeed, thought would be impossible without this realistic 
factor, and this inheres in the nature of thought as one of its conditions. (Ulrici 
means by thought, “all spiritual activities or the spirit itself as activity.”) We 
cannot doubt or deny the existence of thought, for such denial or doubt is 
activity. 
This is the real meaning in Des Cartes’ famous cogiio erqo stim and this 
truth is the starting point of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, Nevertheless Ulrici is 
unwilling to proceed with Lotze from the fundamental ascertion “I think,” 
because this is not an irresolvable and unambiguous concept, but rather from 
“IT IS THOUGHT,” i. e., eliminating entirely the implied problem, “who thinks?” 
This thought must not be called with Fichte “my thought” for my thought is 
distinguished as 7nine only when compared with his ox yours. It is quite incorrect 
to say with Lotze “my thought would obviously remain mine even though every 
other personality were suddenly annihilated,” for, true as this is as a general 
statement, it would not be true in consciousness except as the memory or mental 
representative of these other personalities remained, thus taking the place of the 
actual personalities in my consciousness and continuing the process of compar- 
ison or contrast. The criticism thus applied to the concept ndne applies equally 
to that of /. The self-consciousness implied in the word “I” Ulrici believes is 
itself a product of an effort of the intellect. 
The only thing about thinking which cannot be denied or doubted is its 
active character, for even the denial is an effort of the intellect. Abstraction, 
denial, doubt, all are efforts of thought. It is impossible to go back of the pri- 
mary statement thought is activity. As Trendelenburg has shown, all definitions 
of activity assume the knowledge of what is to be defined. Lotze, indeed, re- 
sponds that it is possible to regard the phenomena of thought as a passive 
happening in which the mind is simply affected. .“Fragen. Untersuchen, Wissen 
kann ich zwar allerdings als Thaten, als Handlung auffassen . . . ich kann 
jedoch ebensowohl dieses ganze innere Leben als eine Reihe von Zustaenden, 
eine Geschichte ansehen, so dass das ganze Schauspiel meiner passiven Zustaende 
ensteht, die ich bald Frage, bald Untersuchung, bald Wissen nenne.” But we 
think he is fairly answered M^hen Ulrici says, “the difference between Lotze 
and me consists only in this, he proceeds from definite concepts and their 
activity without inquiring into their origin or the source originating them, 
while I begin with thought as the force which originates these concepts. 
But, I ask, how can concepts be “in me” without my distinguishing them from 
■•'-System der Logik, Leipzig, 1852, p. 6, et. seq. 
