BULLETIN OF DENISON UNIVERSITY. 
143 
myself or one from another. Further, how is it possible to conceive of, not 
merely knowledge' alone, but even questioning and research as merely passive 
conditions of the inner life ?” 
After alljUlrici comes upon the ground here indicated when he adds, ‘‘Cer- 
tainty is simply impossible without a something which is certain, (subject) and 
another something of which it is certain (object), Being certain of something is 
really the-act of separating in the intellectual process the subjective and objective 
element. Thus the essential element in thought is discrimination or comparison.” 
We may accept Lotze’s reasoning so far as to admit that being 
comes within the range of our consciousness only in the torm of energy. 
All attempts to define that in which this energy resides prove illusory.* 
We discover, however, that in our own consciousness all these several 
forms of energy are efficaceous — must be in order to rise into con- 
sciousness. This being so, there must be in us that which can con- 
vert all energies into its own. This fact, taken in connection with the 
inductive law of physics that all the material forces are correlated and 
convertible, warrants us in assuring the unity of all being in a common 
sphere. 
That all forces are convertible implies the possibility of resolving 
all into one, in which case substance, the unknown ground of energy, 
reduces to a like level of uniformity — not a pleasant outlook. Let us 
trace this thought further. If all forces resolve into one then the pos- 
sibility of reaction ceases, for in strictness, the same force, cannot 
operate in opposite directions. Where, however, all force is identical 
there is no display of energy, or, in other words, all has peished. It 
is then impossible to conceive of these extinct energies ever being re- 
■*Tn the attempt to mediate being and thought, Trendelenburg seeks a form 
of activity common to both. This he finds in motion, and, accordingly, motion 
is that definite form of activity which unites thought and being — activity is the 
universal, motion the particular 
Really, however, there is nothing gained by the apparent analysis over the 
more general statement that thought and being — soul and body — are inherently 
active. The common character of this activity is not proved to be motion, or, if 
both are assumed to be forms of motion, other proof is still needed to explain the 
interaction between them. 
Lotze does good service in emphasizing the fact that materiality is not a 
self-evident condition of interaction between two beings. The other view is 
older than Lucretius. 
“Turn porro varios rerum sentimus odores, 
Nec tamen ad naris venientis cernimus umquam, 
Nec calidos aestus tuimiir nec frigora quimus 
Usurpare oculis nec voces cernere suemus ; 
Quae tamen omnia corporea constare necessest 
Natura quoniam sensus impellere possunt, 
Tangere enim et tangi, nisi corpus, nulla potest res.” 
— De Rei'Min Natura, I, 298—304. 
We conceive that the theory of being proposed above shows how the com- 
mon-sense notion that similarity of attribute is a prerequisite to interaction orig- 
inates. We have seen that the essential thing in attribute is activity. If two 
beings resemble each other, it is simply because they act in the same way ; but 
acting in the same way in opposite nodes or multiple measure is the essence of 
interaction. 
