INTRODUCTION 
Before we begin to consider the phenomena of mind 
throughout the animal kingdom it is desirable that we 
should understand, as far as possible, what it is that we 
exactly mean by mind. Now, by mind we may mean two 
very different things, according as we contemplate it in 
our own individual selves, or in other organisms. For if 
we contemplate our own mind, we have an immediate 
cognizance of a certain flow of thoughts or feelings, which 
are the most ultimate things, and indeed the only things, 
of which we are cognisant. But if we contemplate mind 
in other persons or organisms, we have no such imme- 
diate cognizance of thoughts or feelings. In such cases 
we can only infer the existence and the nature of 
thoughts and feelings from the activities of the organisms 
which appear to exhibit them. Thus it is that we may 
have a subjective analysis of mind and an objective 
analysis of mind— the difference between the two con- 
sisting in this, that in our subjective analysis we are 
restricted to the limits of a single isolated mind which 
we call our own, and within the territory of which we 
have immediate cognizance of all the processes that are 
going on, or at any rate of all the processes that fall 
within the scope of our introspection. But in our ob- 
jective analysis of other or foreign minds we have no 
such immediate cognizance ; all our knowledge of their 
operations is derived, as it were, through the medium of 
ambassadors — these ambassadors being the activities of 
the organism. Hence it is evident that in our study of 
animal intelligence we are wholly restricted to the ob- 
jective method. Starting from what I know subjectively 
